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INTRODUCTION 
After Germany declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941, 
Allied military strategists decided to give priority to the defeat of Hitler's forces 
which had already overrun most of Europe. But before the Allies were to build 
up a force strong enough to cross the English Channel and establish a front on 
land against Germany, the American Army Air Force (AAF) joined the British 
Royal Air Force (RAF) in the already raging air war against German dominated 
Europe. The strategic goal for the Allied air campaign was finalized at the 
Casablanca Conference, in January 1943. According to the adopted policy 
statement, called the Combined Bomber Offensivethe US Army Air Force 
and the RAF were to use their air strength for the "progressive destruction and 
dislocation of the enemy's war industrial and economic system and the 
undermining of his morale to a point where his capacity for armed resistance is 
fatally weakened."2 
After the Allied invasion of Italy which began with a landing on Sicily on 
July 10, 1943, the Americans moved a part of their flying force to Italy, in order 
to facilitate a more efficient bombing of Austria and parts of Eastern Europe 
from the South, rather than from across the English Channel. The American 
15th Army Air Force was officially created on November 1, 1943.3 Under the 
command of General Spaatz, it was assigned the task of the bombing of Austria 
1
 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences a' Washington. 1941-1942. and 
Casablanca. 1943. fWashington: U.S. Government Printing Office,1968), p 746. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Buchanan A. Russell, The United States & World War II. Vol. I. (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1964), p 209. 
1 
and parts of Eastern Europe/ HeadquartefS were set up in Bari, Italy, and 
planes began to fly out of Foggia International Airport.5 
In July 1944, after D-Day, the British Air Ministry formulated proposals for 
speeding up the end of the war through "aerial terror raids." A proposal 
document contained suggestions for the bombing of small towns, raids on 
larger cities, and the strafing of roads and railroads.6 A copy was sent to 
Washington; after analysis, the American General Laurence Kuter, the Assistam 
Chief of Air Staff for planning, contended that it was "contrary to our national 
ideals to wage war against civilians," but Genera! Henry ("Hap") Arnold, his 
superior, came out in favor of it and proposed strafing and bombing of 
populated areas, believing the sight of Allied aircraft flying over Germany would 
"deepen the [Germans'] feelings of hopelessness."7 By that time, major German 
cities, such as Hamburg and Berlin, had already been extensively bomced, 
mostly by the RAF's massive use of "precision bombing" at night.8 
Even though moral considerations were concerns in the discussion on 
the adoption of a bombing plan, as well as worries about public opinion, at 
this point the U.S. rejected the British concept in favor of "strategic 
bombardment," a concept already accepted in January 1943 by the American 
Army Air Force. It was argued that "strategic bombardment" would play an 
important part in the final defeat of the enemy.9 The official intent was "to cause 
disruption of the enemy's war effort by bombarding vitally important industrial 
'"Ronald Schafter. Winas of Judgment. American Bombing in WWII (New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), p 38. 
1
 Claude Parker, Cuckoo over Vienna (Traverse City: Village Press, 1989), p 27. 
'Judgment, pp 80-81. 
7
 Ibid. 
' i.e. the bombing of specific military and economic targets. (Strategic bombirg = bombing of 
urban areas with a long-range aim of disrupting the German economy ) Judgment, pp. 35-38. 
8
 Judgment, pp 80-81. 
3 
installations, and destroying specific targets, thereby breaking down the fighting 
ability and morale of the enemy."10 Thereupon American bombing of Vienna 
and other parts of Austria, (annexed to the Reich in 1938,) began in earnest. 
Before regular bombing began, there had been two previous isolated 
incidents. The first was the bombing of the Messerschmitt factory, in August 
1943. This factory in Wiener Neustadt, about 25 miles south of Vienna, 
produced single-engine fighter aircraft. The second consisted of an attack on 
Vienna itself, in January 1944. Following two more attacks in the spring of 
1944, regular bombing of Vienna began in September 1944 and increased in 
the following months. When the attacks ceased in April 1945, following the 
Soviet capture of the city, the population had endured a total of 110 air attacks, 
215 hours and 30 minutes in duration, and causing the deaths of 8769 
civilians." The Americans used most often general purpose (GP) bombs of 
either 227 or 454 kilograms of weight, containing 51% explosives, and 
demolition bombs, with 60% explosives.12 
The American bombing presented a new challenge for the city 
government as well as the city population who found themselves ensconced 
already in the dire circumstances of a 5-year war.13 The city government, 
stripped of its pre-Anschluss officials, consisted of dedicated National Socialist 
party members from Germany proper who spouted Nazi philosophy in all their 
10
 Ibid. 
n
 All statistics of Vienna air attacks from: Official Statistics of Frequency and Results of 
Bombinc. as reported by the Chief of the Statistics Office of the Crty of Vienna, Dr. Karl Pospischil 
in the collection Reports of private persons (survivors.') (Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/83--1-3, 
part 1, folder 1, and VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44.), Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (City Archives). 
12Heeresgeschichtliches'Museum, (Museum of Military History) Vienna, 1994 exhibrtior. 
"Walkuere und der Totenwald. Das Kriegsjahr 1944," display item with description. 
13
 The British, except for minor sporadic incidents earlier in the Austrian provinces, did not get 
involved in the bombardment of Vienna; it fell therefore to the Americans to direct their bombing 
power towards the city. 
4 
endeavors, but needed the cooperation of the population, not only in the quest 
for winning the war, but also to survive. Viennese citizens, coping with every¬ 
day deprivation and struggling to survive, had to rely ever more on the heip of 
the government and its aid programs in order to exist. The bombing seemed to 
bring out their resilience and a determination to pursue their normal day-to-day 
life as much as possible until the end of the war. 
While various aspects of WWII, including American bombing missions, 
have been treated and analyzed, the bombing of Vienna and its impact on the 
population has escaped major attention, especially in English-language 
literature. It is the intent of this thesis to trace the history of the 1944-1945 
bombing of Vienna and the response of the government and the population to 
this ordeal. 
CHAPTER !: THE AIR ATTACKS 
Vienna experienced the full-fledged air war only from September 1944 to 
April 1945, but then in all its severity in terms of the destruction of housing and 
lost lives, as well as the destruction of major cultural monuments. The inclusion 
of Austria in the air war (--only Germany proper had been bombed so far-) 
followed from a number of factors:14 
By 1944, Austria had become integrated into the Nazi war effort. Because 
of the bombing of her war production facilities, Germany transferred some of 
her war-related production to Austria, which had become labeled as "the air raid 
shelter of the Reich." Small Austrian factories were also built into bigger ones, 
making Austria more inviting as a target. 
The Allies recognized the geographical position of Austria between Italy 
ana the rest of Germany, as well as its role as a gateway io southeastern 
Europe as strategically important. Railway lines from Germany to these areas 
went through Austria. Fresh supplies, troops and ammunition for the South- 
Eastern (Balkan) fronts were transported through Austria. The Danube river, 
which went through Austria and Vienna, served as the most important inner 
waterway for the shipment of Rumanian oil into Germany. After the Allied 
conquest of Southern Italy and the establishment of Allied air bases there, 
Austna became vulnerable to Allied air attacks from the south and a prime 
military target. The important war-related facilities in Austria were: 
" Johann Ulrich. Per Luftkriea ueber Oesterreich 1939-1945 (Vienna: Oesterreichischer 
Bundesverlag fuer Unterricht. Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1967), pp 1-7. 
5 
6 
(1) airplane factories 
in Wiener Neustadt (--the Messerschmitt plant, together with the facility in 
Regensburg, produced 48% of all German single-engine airplanes-), 
in Schwechat (about 6 miles outside of Vienna,) and Klagenfurt (in the 
province of Carinthia,) 
(2) steel, chemical and fuel plants 
particularly the oilfields in Zistersdorf (province of Lower Austria), 
refineries in Vienna-Floridsdorf and other districts cn the periphery of 
Vienna, 
(3) transportation factories 
such as the Steyr-Daimler-Puch truck manufacturing plan;: in 
Vienna, Wiener Neustadt and Steyr (Upper Austria), and the 
"Hermann Goering" Panzer factory in Linz.'5 
The bombing of industrial targets were highlighted by an attack on 
Wiener Neustadt in August of 1943. The air raid concentrated on Wiener 
Neustadt, because it contained the only significant Messerschmitt airplane 
factory in the country, it has been estimated that between 1943-1945, the 
whole town was 88% destroyed.16 
Sporadic air attacks on Vienna started in September of 1943 and 
increased in frequency and intensity as the war progressed.17 In January 1944. 
15
 Today the state-subsidized Austrian steel plant, "VOEST." 
15
 Per Luftkrieq. p 6-7. 
'
7
"Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/83--1-3", part 1, folder 1: "Berichte von privaten Personen 
("Reports of Private Persons",) Official Statistics of Frequency and Results of Bombing. City 
Archives. 
7 
only one took place, with no fatalities; there were two attacks in April, killing 161 
people. Air attacks increased in number with thirteen in December, which 
lasted altogether 29 hours, 33 minutes and caused 347 fatalities. For the entire 
year 1944, the total number of air attacks was 63; the attacks lasted 103 hours, 
43 minutes, and 4,175 people were killed. The course of daily life in Vienna 
was interrupted every second or third day. 
In 1945, the number of attacks increased. In March, 17 attacks took 
place, lasting 54 hours and 31 minutes; 1,526 civilians were killed. By April, 
accurate statistics could no longer be kept because of widespread confusion 
and chaos, capped by heavy fighting in the streets, as the Soviets attacked 
Vienna from the east and the bureaucracy ceased to function. Though the 
end of the war was clearly in sight, by March 1945 air attacks on Vienna took 
place daily and nightly until April 9. On April 13, 1945, the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian 
Army under Marshall Tolbukhin captured Vienna.16 Bombing of other parts of 
Austria lasted until April 29, when capitulation on the Southern front was 
announced and a new Austrian government was formed. In 1945, from January 
until the first part of April, 41 attacks lasting 101 hours and 30 minutes took 
place, and 4594 fatalities were recorded. If the single attacks from 1943 are 
also counted, the number of air raids on Vienna during the war totaled 110, 
their duration was 215 hours and 30 minutes, and 8769 civilians were killed/9 
Two hundred and fifteen total hours of actual bombing time may seem 
little when measured against a certain time frame, but how deeply the air 
attacks became imprinted on the minds of the frightened people who fled into 
16
 Hi inh Trpvnr-Roper ed. Final Entries. 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels (New York: 
Avon, 1979) , p 417. 
14
 Per Luftkriea. pp 30-31. 
8 
the shelters can only be imagined; an examination of the statistics of a single 
day may highlight the destruction of an average bombardment: 
The Air Defense Damage Report of June 16, 1944, of an attack on the 
Vienna suburb of Floridsdorf, a peripheral district with some heavy industry as 
well as housing, was compiled by the Vienna Chief of Police himself, Herr 
Gotzmann.23 This document, originally stamped "classified," assessed 
damages and accounted for people's lives: 
Loss of life : 209 
Wounded: 1239 
Houses hit: 895 
Totally destroyed: 57 
Heavily damaged: 107 
Medium damage 122 
Light damage 609 
Count of bombs 774 
Public buildings hit: 
railway station Floridsdorf 
public bath Floridsdorf 
public pawn shop 
Office of Health 
NSV2" Headquarters 
(1 incendiary bomb) 
(3 incendiary bombs) 
(5 incendiary bombs) 
(2 incendiary bombs) 
(6 incendiary bombs) 
20
 "Kleine Bestaende" Gruppe VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44, City Archives. 
21
 NSV = Nationalsozialistische Volks Wohlfahrt (National Socialistic Peoples' Welfare.) 
9 
Additional targets hit: Reich railroad premises, 
street cars, tracks and 
overhead wires, 
electric-, gas-, and water 
works. 
If the number of 209 people killed by the bombing seems high, it must be 
pointed out that this attack was only one of the earlier, smaller ones. The 
heaviest air attack took place on March 12, 1945, in which not only 925 people 
perished and lost their homes but, in addition, numerous industrial as well as 
cultural buildings were hit.2 
On that day, according to Goebbels' diary, as many as 550 American 
four-engined bombers from Italy raided Vienna.3 A later Austrian account 
reports 747 bombers (225 B-17 and 522 B-24) and calls the mission the biggest 
single operation of the 15th AAF. 1,667 tons of bombs were thrown at the oil 
refinery in Vienna-Floridsdorf.* An American account for that day, though, 
reports otherwise:3 
"12 March: Fifteenth AF: 90 B-24's and B-17's bomb Vienna/Floridsdorf 
oil refinery and alternate tgts of Graz, . . . Bad weather forces 60 P-51's sent 
against Austrian comm [communications] to abort." 
""Kieine Bestaende" Gruppe VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44, City Archives. 
"Final Entries, p. 147. (Goebbels' account of statistical figures stem from government 
reports.) 
" Per Luftkrieq. p 29. 
" Kit. C. Carter and Robert Mueller, Combat Chronology 1941 - 1945 (Washington, DC: 
Center for Air Force History,1991), p 597. According to its foreword, (p III) the Combat 
Chronology "is a factual record of combat operations conducted by the United States Army Air 
Forces during World War II. No attempt has been made to interrelate the events." 
10 
The second-heaviest attack was recorded on Feb 21,1945, with 849 
fatalities, and the third-heaviest on Sep 10,1944, with 776 fatalities.26 Again, 
there is only laconic acknowledgment in American sources:27 
"10 September: Fifteenth AF: 344 B-17's and B-24's bomb 5 crdlnance 
depots and SE industrial area in Vienna and 2 oil refineries in the area." 
Compared with the great amount of damage and destruction of buildings, 
the loss of human life was, in hindsight relatively small. If we take into account 
that 110 air attacks took place during the 1944-1945 period, the loss of iess than 
9000 lives is not excessive. The Chief of the Statistical Office offered the 
following explanations for relatively high survival rates of the Viennese 
population:28 
(1) An enforced building code 
Details had been well-thought-out; for example, wooden stairwells were 
not allowed; roofs had to be separated from the top floor. 
(2) Height of buildings 
Since, statistically, rural districts of Vienna had heavier losses, it was 
assumed that the height and multiplicity of stories in the apartment 
buildings contributed to survival. Often the bombs did not penetrate to 
the basement. 
i6
"Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/82-1/ RA - 71/44, City Archives. 
27
 Cornbal Chronology, p 447. 
26;
'Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/83--1-3: "Reports of private persons," City Archives 
11 
(3) Adherence to rules 
Strict adherence to the rules, which became law," such as descending to 
basements as well as all the other rules of self-protection, contributed to 
survival and in the end justified themselves. 
4) Indoctrination and acceptance of authority 
Playing on ready acceptance of higher authority by the populace, Nazi 
indoctrination turned out to be helpful for the implementation and 
acceptance of the strict ruies of air protection and played a major role 
in upholding the morale of the people and their ultimate survival. 
(5) A professional fire department 
Founded in 1686, it had a long tradition of prompt arrival at the stricken 
place. Stations were located in parts of the city in such a way that under 
most circumstances, the first vehicle was able to arrive- at its destination 
within five minutes of notification." 
6) Fewer fire bombs dropped 
Major surface fires, like the ones in German cities, did not take place 
because Vienna was spared, except for a few instances, the fire 
bombing that ravaged some German cites.31 
For example, on the night of July 24/25, 1943, the British attacked 
Hamburg with 700 aircraft, resulting in firestorms.® Again, on July 29/30, the city 
" The Air Defense Law went into effect September 1, 1939. ( It will be highlighted in the 
next chapter.) 
30
 Referat FD4, Berufsfeuerwehr der Stadt Wien (Mayl1994) : 12. This particular fact is 
confirmed by (he historian of the the Vienna Fire Department, Helmut Bouzek. ( Personal 
Interview with Helmut Bouzek. August 1994.) 
31
 Ibid. Also: Hugo Portisch & Sepp Riff, Oesterreich II: Der lanoe Weq zur Freiheit (Vienna: 
Kremayrand Scheriau, 1985) , p 46. "A particular reason," says historian Helmut Bouzek "why 
there were fewer fire bombs used than in German cities, was never found; it's just a fact." 
32
 Peter Young, A Short History of World War II 1939-1945 (New York: Crowel!, 1966), pp 261- 
2. 
12 
was bombed and from an economic point of view was now practically "knocked 
out." Nearly a million inhabitants fled, 40,000 died and about the same number 
were injured, all by 7,196 tons of bombs. What made the devastation so 
complete, again, were the types of bombs utilized: high capacity bombs, high 
explosives and incendiary bombs, capable of starting terrible and 
uncontrollable fires. In another case of the usage of incendiary bombs, on 
February 3,1945, in only one attack on Berlin, 25,000 civilians lost their lives. 
Answering widespread protests, Allied Air Force leaders insisted that they were 
not conducting terror warfare, but striking legitimate military objectives such as 
rail centers.33 
The reasons for the "better treatment" of Austria in comparison with the 
German cities have never been defined. In 1942 alone, whiie Austria was still 
considered a safe haven, 41,400 tons of bombs nad been already dropped on 
Germany; and by October 1942, the number of civilians' death stood at 10,900, 
according to Goebbels' reports.34 One cannot help but think that an element of 
revenge was involved on the part of the Allies. Germany, after ail, had instigated 
the war and had furthermore bombed England. 
Statistics of London which suffered the September 1940-May 1941 
"Blitz"-bombing attacks of the Nazi Luftwaffe, reveal that up to November 13th, 
1940, an average of 160 bombs were dropped daily with an average of 200 
tons of high explosives, while 182 canisters of incendiaries were disposed of 
nightly.35 On October 15th, there were 410 planes over London, and they 
33
 One reason for this particular Berlin raid had been the understanding that the German Sixth 
Panzer Army was moving through Berlin on its way from the Western to the Eastern front. 
"Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1977), p 
167. 
35
 Angus Caider.The People's War, Britain-1939-1945 (New York:Pantheon Books, 1969), p 
168. 
13 
dropped 538 tons of high explosives, causing more than 25,000 casualties; 
over 900 fires were started. From the beginning of September 1940 to mid-May 
1941, German bombardiers killed nearly 40,000 people in London, Coventry, 
and other urban centers, and destroyed the homes of many thousands more. 
Not only did Vienna's population survive with somewhat fewer casualties 
than those of other large cities, it also was better protected than the citizens of 
other Austrian cities. This can be demonstrated by comparing the ratio of 
victims in Vienna with those of other Austrian cities:36 
PER 1000 INHABITANTS KILLED 
in Vienna: 5 
Wr. Neustadt: 25 
Attnang Puchheim37 203 
The Nazi system of civil air raid defense contributed greatly to the 
citizens' survival. Although civil defense could not prevent material destruction, 
it did maintain order until the end and prevented chaos. 
36
 Oesterreich II. p 47. 
37
 An important railroad connection point. 
CHAPTER 2: AIR DEFENSE 
Only stupid people will disregard air protection.38 Only stupid 
people will not understand the high goal of air protection. A 
recognized danger is only half a danger. Man has always 
overcome any danger, no matter what kind, if his will remained 
unshakable.® 
The Reich Minister of Defense and Aviation, Hermann Goering, well 
aware that "regardless of how large we built the German Luftwaffe, it won't be 
enough to provide real protection to the population and to protect them entirely 
from the consequences of an air attack," created, nevertheless, a most 
organized and effective program of air protection for the population.*5 
The Air Defense Law 
The Air Defense Law was the umbrella law, which regulated the goals 
and execution of air protection for both the military and the civilians.11 (Only the 
latter will be discussed here.) The law was so detailed that it provided for 
appropriate behavior in almost every situation and contained sublaws for even 
the most minor matters. Air defense was to be, according to the official 
definition, the sum of all means which the national government used "for the 
protection of Volk and Reich against enemy air attacks." In Vienna, the laws and 
34
 Note: the original German word, used in documents, is "L.uftschutz," which literally means 
"air protection," but the word "air defense," literally meaning "Luftverteidigung" in German, is 
commonly used in American literature. 
38
 Hermann Goering, Berlin Sports Palace, 1935, according to Prologue of Luftschutz 
brochure, Box 1942/1, Archives of the Vienna Police Headquarters. 
40
 Ibid. 
" Reichsgesetzbiatt - RGBI. I s.1631, September 1,1939, Box 1942/1, Police Archives 
14 
15 
regulations were published in a series of ReichsgesetzbiaeUer (RGBI).42 They 
were reiterated by the highest political authority in Vienna, the Reichssiatthaiter, 
Baldur von Schirach, and repeated, explained and interpreted in additional 
executive orders, directives and memos, all published in the Amtsblaetter 
(A.BI.)43 Obedience to regulations was reinforced by all means of Reich 
propaganda. The police as the enforcer of proper procedures maintained 
order, even under the heaviest bombardment. Included in the Air Defense Law 
were extensive systems of air defense strategy14 as well as civilian air 
protection/^The air defense consisted of: 
(1) the flight-reporting service -- "Flugmeldedienst" (FMD), 
(2) the air defense warning service -- "Luftschutzwarndienst" 
(LSD), 
(3) the execution of military defense - "Abwehr." 
The civilian air protection consisted of: 
(1) operation of air shelters, 
(2) regulations pertaining to "rules of behavior in shelters," 
(3) relief programs. 
<2State legal pamphlets. 
"Official pamphlets. 
" Box 1942/1, Archives of the Police Headquarters. 
45
 Ibid. 
16 
Air Defense strategy 
FMD and LSD 
The FMD cooperated with the LSD by transmitting news and sightings to 
the LSD which in turn notified a string of official institutions as well as the 
civilian population by means of three warning signals: "air danger alert," "air 
attack alarm," "air danger over." 
At "Air danger," the population was warned through the radioby the tone 
of a cuckoo --a sound that became infamous--, which interrupted regular 
programming.46 It meant that enemy airplanes had become airborne from their 
stations in Italy and could reach the city in about 20 minutes. If the planes did 
not approach Austria, the signal was cleared and regular programming 
resumed, but if the planes indeed continued on towards Austria, the next phase 
took place: 
The signal of "Air attack alarm" was indicated through a consistent up- 
and-down wailing tone that emerged from the public address system, installed 
all over town, and summoned the population to seek shelter. At the same time, 
the regular radio program went off the air and wire service began to report 
progressively on the "air situation."47 Anyone interested could follow the reports 
on the "air situation map," a copy of which was distributed to each household. 
On it, the city of Vienna with its surrounding territory was divided into 
numbered sections, and the numbers, continually announced over the wire 
service, would inform the listeners of the sections over which the air planes 
were flying. 
46
 Hitler had advocated that every household be in possession of an uniform black box, called 
the "Volksempfaenger," -- "the people's radio receiver," which was mass-produced and affordable 
for everyone. 
"Thomas Chorherr, Wien. Die Geschichte einer Weltstadt im Heldenzeitalter (Vienna: 
Ueberreuter, 1987), p 294. 
17 
When the "Air danger" was over, a consistent even tone signified that 
the attacks had ceased and assured the population that it was safe again to 
leave the shelters and return to their dwellings or work. 
Military defense - Abwehr 
By the end of January 1944, one could question the effectiveness of the 
German Luftwaffe, and by March 1944, the Allies considered the Germans to 
have lost the air war for good.48 In Austria, there was practically no air defense 
by means of air fighters.49 When Wiener Neustadt was heavily and surprisingly 
bombed, on August 13th, 1943, (--the air raid warning system was then still 
inadequate--) there existed only two small airports, one in Voeslau, just outside 
of Vienna, with only one "Jagdverband"- (fighter squadron) and one in Pels am 
Wagram. The situation of the Luftwaffe was dismal.® 
In addition, that same year air plane factories were hit and thus cut down 
on defensive capability. In Wiener Neustadt, tor example, 180 completed 
Jaegers were totally destroyed; the Heinckel-Nachtjaeger factory in Heidfeld at 
Schwechat and Zwoelfaxing (a few miles southeast of Vienna) was disabled; 
and even substitute underground facilities such as the Goettweig monastery's 
cellar and several wine cellars in Lower Austria, used for the production of 
airplane parts, were hit and rendered unusable. Finally, the bombing of the 
'
9
 The United States arvi Worid War II. pp 209-212 (This was at the time the opnion of the 
Allies.) 
Per Luftkriea. p 8. 
"Norbert Schausberger, Ruestunq in Oesterreich 1938-1945 (Vienna: Brueder 
Ho!!inek,1Q70), pp 148-50. 
18 
Research Center on Flying in Vienna-Floridsdorf on June 16 and 26, 1944, 
saw the beginning of attacks on small and medium Vienna firms which 
manufactured armament products.5' 
One of the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Luftwaffe was the 
Allies' realization that they could keep the enemy aircraft permanently on the 
ground by targeting German fuel resources. On June 8th, 1944, the Allies 
made destruction of German oi! production officially a top-priority goal;52 and 
even though the production of German aircraft actually increased during the 
remainder of the year, some of it could not be used. A shortage of trained pilots 
existed because, paradoxically, pilots in training had to conserve fuel which 
was in short supply because of the Luftwaffe's inability to adequately protect oil 
facilities. 
Between the end of 1944 and March 1945, the Allies made 555 attacks 
on 135 Reich targets, which included every known synthetic-fuel plant and 
major refinery. The effect on German oil production can be seen from this chart: 
PERIOD AVERAGE OUTPUT IN TONS PER MONTH 
May, 1944 662,000 
June 422,000 
December 260,000 
March 1945 80,000 
The production of aviation gasoline went down from 170,000 tons per 
month in mid-1944 to 52,000 in the following March. The Luftwaffe's ability to 
51
 The Hofherr-Schrantz factory in Vienna-Floridsdorf manufactured parts for the A-4 rocket. 
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fight attacking Allied planes in the air was therefore very limited, both in 
Germany proper and in Austria. At various times, Goebbels, in his diary, reports 
"a total of 7 aircraft" shot down out of 600 American bombers by German 
fighters, then "4 out of 350, " 4 out of 600," and "8 out of 500.After the August 
1943 attack on Wiener Neustadt, on the way back to their bases (--then still in 
Tunis-) the Allied planes were attacked by 50-60 German Jaegers, but only 3 
bombers were hit; on November 2nd, 1943, during another attack on Wiener 
Neustadt, 17 bombers were shot down, by Jaegers and the FLAK." 
FLAK 
The FLAK turned out to be the only available means of military air 
defense in Austria, it operated under the Luftgaukommando XVII as the 24th 
FLAK division with 32 batteries in and around Vienna, and with a manpower of 
4000 Luftwaffe "helpers." The latter were comprised of specially trained 
civilians and 16- to 18-year-old Hitler Youth boys.55 
The American side viewed the FLAK as follows: 
Radar was one of the outstanding technical developments of WWII. 
Problems though lay in the fact that not only Allied powers made use of 
Radar but that the Luftwaffe used it as well, as a means for their own 
protection, thus making the bombing operations for the Americans 
sometimes hazardous. . . Allied bombers considered flying through flak 
the most dangerous part of a mission: they dreaded traveling through the 
exploding shells sent up by guns.56 
" Final Entries, pp 182,193, 248, 351. 
" Per Luftkrieq. p 10. FLAK = Fliegerabwehrkanone (anti-aircraft artillery). 
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The 15th AAF, which was the target of the Austrian FLAK, report in their 
"Lone Wolf-military pamphlet: 
Some battle damage due to flak has been experienced ever 
heavily defended targets by Lone Wolf aircraft. It is probable that 
some of our losses have been caused either directly, or at least 
contributed to, by enemy ground fire. . . Single-aircraft operations 
allow for an increase in bombing altitude not possible on normal 
operations when formations must be flown. This allows Lone 
Wolves to bomb from a height where enemy flak is less effective . . 
. In view of the ineffectiveness of the fighter opposition put forth by 
the enemy, it is believed that this practice has been proved 
sound.57 
Despite great efforts and extensive organization, aside from occasional 
hits, the FLAK was not very effective, even by the Austrians' own accounts.50 But 
although its operations didn't live up to its promise, —"FLAK . . . by itself . . . 
downed few planes"-- it did have a function which could not be easily 
dismissed, a fact acknowledged by American pilots: . . [it ]was annoying and 
caused varying damage to aircraft."® 
An entrance in Joseph Goebbels' diary,83 on March 16, 1945, noting that 
of "some 600 American four-engined bombers ... a total of 7 aircraft were shot 
down by our fighters and anti-aircraft,"61 only confirms the ineffectiveness of the 
FLAK as well as the Luftwaffe. Disillusioned and dissatisfied, he says: 
" 15th AAF. Monograph # 95824: Operational emphasis of Lone Wolfe Tactics (Office of 
ACofS, A-3, Oct-Dec 1944) p. 36. 
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The air war has now turned into a crazy orgy. We are totally defenceless 
against it. The Reich will gradually be turned into a complete desert. 
Responsibility for this lies at the door of Goering and his Luftwaffe. It is 
absolutely not in any position to put up any form of defence.® 
Although the military leadership on both sides found the Austrian FLAK 
ineffective, one particular participant in the air war got to experience its effect in 
a way that enabled him to perceive the air war over Vienna from a special 
perspective: the 15th AAF bomber pilot, Lieutenant Parker, describes his 
predicament at being shot out of the sky on a bomber mission rather 
laconically: "... B-17 was hit by flak and immediately burst into flames . . . 
bailed out."63 FLAK crews took their assignment very seriously. If a FLAK gunner 
managed to shoot down a plane, it became a major boost to his and his 
collegues' morale. 
Despite the overall ineffectiveness of the FLAK operations, the towers 
were manned at all times. FLAK operators used their time effectively; 
education was brought right to the crews of the batteries, with teachers 
conducting classes on the premises. Education even included readings by 
poets and authors, as well as musical performances by the Vienna Choir Boys. 
Citizens' air raid protection 
The Reich had prepared itself as early as 1939 for air defense,51 fully 
realizing that the cooperation of the citizens was going to be important for 
meeting the onslaught of aerial bombing physically as well as psychologically. 
62
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The psychological part was put into practice later, when the bombings 
actualily started, through extensive propaganda, with the goal of counteracting 
the enemy's stated purpose of lowering civilian morale through bombing. 
Preparations for helping the citizen survive the bombing raids physically, began 
already in 1939 and consisted of: 
bomb shelters, 
orders and regulations, and 
relief programs. 
Bomb shelters 
Bomb shelters were operated according to the "Order for air shelters" 
("Schutzraumordnung").65 The shelters had to be utilized according to 
prescribed rules of behavior, some of which were practiced in special drills.® At 
the sound of an alarm, all persons in buildings, apartments, offices, shoos, 
theaters, inns, streets, e.t.c., were required to proceed to an air shelter room. 
The following rules had to be observed: 
They had to be in posession of a "Lufischutzkoffer'-air shelter suit case- 
which was to contain family documents and a gas mask. They had to observe 
certain prohibitions: 
No smoking! 
No animals, except seeing-eye dogs or other service dogsi57 
<s
 Al! regulations, contained in the Air Protection Law, September 1, 1 939, in folder 6-8, box 
82, City Archives. 
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The bomb shelters had to be organized in a prescribed way; some of the 
requirements were as follows: 
Air shelters were supposed to be in basements, tunnels, or caves. 
Each shelter was supposed to house not more than 50 persons. 
At least three cubic meters of space was required for each person. 
An emergency exit was obligatory. 
All openings were supposed to be made "gas-safe," with a covering of 
cloth, felt, rubber, glue or even paper. 
Before the war, most basements of buildings served as storage facilities 
for heating materials (wood or coal) or bulk groceries (potatoes, onions, etc) It 
took some adapting to turn them into makeshift shelters, in order to give every 
citizen maximum protection, adherance to the rules and regulations was not 
only expected but was also enforced by the authority of an air shelter warden. 
Each apartment house had a designated "Luftschutzwart," --air shelter 
warden-- whose orders were to be strictly followed. These wardens were 
chosen from male residents too old for military service, disabled veterans, or 
men designated as indispensable."® 
The duties of the warden were, like everything else, heavily regulated.® 
One of his responsibilities was to make certain, that all tenants of the apartment 
house were present in the basement and that each family or single person had 
brought their air shelter suitcase. He also had to admit, aside from tenants, other 
people who happened to be on the streets when the sirens sounded, but this 
particular regulation was rather ambiguous. According to paragraph 2 of the air 
68
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shelter lav;, "pedestrians are to be admitted to shelters -- if there is sufficient 
room. If the air shelter rooms are not sufficient, the pedestrians are to be given 
protection in covered spaces against shrapnel.The phrase, "if there is 
sufficient room," was of course much too vague. It was easy enough for a willful 
warden to declare a basement filled to capacity and off-limits to strangers. In 
turning citizens away, a warden was in a position to flaunt his power arbitrarily, 
or behave in a bureaucratic manner, sticking to the letter of the regulation. 
One particular incident involving a telephone meter reader, Karoline 
Ledinegg, illustrates the ambiguity of the particular phrasing "sufficient room.71 
Following a schedule of planned routes, Ledinegg often found herself on the 
street when the sirens sounded and had to seek whatever shelter was 
available for her protection. 
"That day," Karoline Ledinegg recounts, "after finishing with the last 
customer, I began to run down the street, trying to make it home to the second 
district where I lived (-and still live.) I was relatively close, but when I saw the 
streets getting empty and heard the noise of approaching planes getting louder, 
I decided to seek shelter. I turned to the Philippi Hof apartment complex which 
was known for its basement's connection with an extensive underground tunnel 
system, and knocked on the house door, but a pompous warden sent me rudely 
away because, according to him, the basement's capacity was filled. I finally 
took shelter a few houses further down."72 Whether this warden was justified in 
turning her away or not is hard to say, but he very probably saved Karoline 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Telephone- and telegraph services in Austria were (--and still are-) part of the postal 
services. Meter reading has since become automated. 
72
 Personal interview with Karoline Ledinegg. 
25 
Ledinegg's life. In one of the major tragedies of the Vienna air war, the Philippi 
Hof was badly hit only minutes later, and several hundred people in the 
basement and the connecting tunnels were killed or reported missing. The 
bombs penetrated so deeply and the damage was so extensive, that many 
bodies were never dug out in the clearance process. Today, a modern sculpture 
on the location of the former Philippi Hof commemrnorates the terrible 
disaster.''"3 
The average warden, no doubt, was cordial and cooperative, took his 
duties seriously and watched out for his fellow neighbors. Of course, he also 
had to follow bureaucratic procedures by keeping records on the fulfillment of 
his duties in the "Air Shelter Folder" which was stamped: "Property of the Reich 
Air Shelter Association."74 
Bomb shelters were the most important life-saving facilities in air raids, 
because of the protection offered to virtually every citizen and the 
brainwashing by the government on using them. Most houses, especially 
apartment houses and apartment house complexes had built-in basements, 
and additional protection was provided by the government which constructed 
extra bunkers and tunnels. Among the latter, notable examples were the 
personal bunker of the Reichsstatthalter of Vienna, Baldur von Schirach,73 and 
the tunnel system underneath the "Philippi Hof" apartment compiex. 
But the shelters were only one facet of the system; in addition, rules, 
regulations and directives on air raids covered required equipment, various 
" Oesterreich II. p 45. The exact number of victims could never be determined. 
"Folder 6-8, box 82, City Hall Archives. 
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situations and even specific behavior of people.76 Instructions were issued 
concerning. 
extinguishing white phosphorus bombs, 
gas attacks, 
disposal of duds, 
availability of shelters to pedestrians 
use of first aid kit, 
air shelter luggage, 
black-out times. 
The regulation on first aid kits, for example, specified its contents. Besides the 
usual items the kit was to also include: 
rubber gloves, 
soap, 
green "smear soap" (for yellow gas accidents) 
sodium bicarbonate, 
calcium chloride.77 
The regulations on the availability of sand and water pails noted: 
Sand and water pails are supposed to be not only on stairwells 
but in each apartment as well. A pail with water and tne sand 
have to be placed next to the entrance. Sand can be picked up at the 
"sand locations" and has to be put into strong paper bags 
(sacks) capable of containing 5 kilos. The bags can only be 
half-filled, have to be tied and pressed flat to be put on top of 
each other. 
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The regulations on air shelter luggage stated that it had to be positioned next to 
the exit door and was to contain: 
important personal documents, 
coats, 
blankets and pillows, 
thermos bottle, 
toys for children, 
groceries. 
The regulation on the required black-out times read: 
The air command has ordered, until October 31, 1943, that the time of 
black-outs be as follows: from 2200 or 2300 to 0400 or 0500 (variation 
because of summer months).^ 
A special regulation on messengers said: 
When the house community cannot help itself anymore, (after bombing) it 
has to send a messenger who has to have the following: good clothes, 
good shoes, head protection, ropes, first aid kit, battery flash light, a 
messenger bag in a strong color, (because it can be found easy) with 
street and house number written on it, paper and pencil, and a bicycle. 
The messenger must be able to transmit the message in writing or orally 
(learn by heart.) The message has to be short, containing: "what," "when," 
"where." 
The regulation on "Feuerpatsche" (asbestos glove) gave tips on how the 
citizens could produce it 
"Amtsblatt S Lu/b I-5533, Septembers, 1943, Police Archives. 
7
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The asbestos glove is a most necessary item for fighting fire. With it the 
base of the fire can be beaten out. Each household should have one. 
Because the need is so great, each citizen has to be instructed to 
produce such an item. The needed material can surely be found in each 
household. They are: a broom stick, cloth rags, wire or string . . . 
The population's proper behavior was not only expected inside the 
shelters, but also outside of buildings. Here are some of the rules:80 
In open places, lie on the ground. 
In markets, protect groceries by covering them against "liquid weapons" 
("fluessige Kampfstoffe.")81 
Stop driving vehicles and park them so that an open lane exists. 
Some regulations addressed particular groups of citizens, such as "war- 
disabled" relatives of police officials, directing them to seek help at an 
installation set up only for them,82 or "cable-walkers," who had to report 
damage to cables after air raids.® The "cable-walkers" had to walk the length of 
the underground cables and inspect them tor damage after air raids so that 
immediate repair could be initiated. They carried an identification and wore a 
white arm band, imprinted with swastika and the words "Deutsche Reichspost - 
"Soforthilfe" -"First aid;" and they were to be assisted and supported by the 
police, if necessary. 
There were also directives concerning trivial subjects, such as fishing, 
elimination of rats, and the opening-times of shops. For example,whoever had 
the desire to do some fishing had to consult the "Fischerei Ordnung," which 
90
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directed him to authorized locations such as the Donaukanai at specific times.^ 
These announcements not only served to inform the population of the 
restoration of services that were formerly interrupted through bomb damages, 
but also tried to convey to the population the notion that life was proceeding 
normally. The latter was regarded important in keeping up the spirit and the 
morale of the people. 
And then, there were "orders" or mere official suggestions, the intentions 
of which were so specific that they bordered on the ridiculous. One household 
item that warranted a regulation of its own was the Conformity Reich Soap 
("Reicheinheitsseife")85 which described in detail the "specifications" of this 
cheaply made tallow soap. Anything better was considered a luxury and 
therefore banned. This regulation was not in too much danger of being violated, 
simply because of the lack of better items. 
Published advice on underwear and stockings could be read in the 
Voelkischer Beobachter which said, "Each person should have underwear and 
stockings to change, so that after 48 hours he won't look like a hobo."® Citizens 
(who for the most part didn't own vehicles) were assured that "No parking" 
regulations did not apply during attacks. Regarding the "people's gas mask," 
one particular specification stated: "The gas mask is to be put on calmly. 
Breathe as little as possible!"87 
But trivial or not, adherence to these regulations often provided the 
difference between survival and non-survival. While extra care might have 
"'Regulation 111/87.00, May 5, 1944, PoliceArchives. 
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seemed exaggerated to the non-bureaucratic mind, the two following incidents 
demonstrate its importance. In the first case, a bomb hit the house 
Augartenstrasse #70, next to a nursery school in the 2nd district, on March 
12th, 1945 but penetrated only as far as the second floor. Because the people 
in the basement had proper equipment, (the legally prescribed tools,) they were 
able to break through the joint wall to the nursery school building 
(Augartenstrasse # 68) with the help of a sledgehammer, escape the still falling 
debris, and join the terrified but unhurt children there.® 
Regulations were violated In the second case and people paid with their 
iives. The regulation on "emergency wails" stated that each person was 
supposed to know which wall had been designated as the break-through wall. 
The top of the wall was to be marked with the words: "Connecting opening to 
the neighboring house" (street name, # ...) as well as with the appropriate 
arrows. The part to be broken was to be marked with paint; and its approach 
was to be kept free at all times.® 
Ali the inhabitants of an apartment house in the 2nd district's 
Karmelitergasse 2, drowned, when water pipes were hit and water flooded the 
basement. The previous actions of the owner of a Gasthaus, located in the next 
house, prevented the victims' escape; he had improperly stacked the escape 
wall with hoarded barrels of wine. "I can still see --so many years later- the 
sidewalk and adjacent street flooded with water that had come out of the 
basement," recalled Karoline Ledinegg, "and the front of the shoe store, also 
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located in this building, where the helpers had laid out, in several rows, the 
drowned, wet bodies.90 
The impact of strict adherence to rules by the citizens cannot be 
overstressed. Compliance with regulations contributed to the survival of many 
citizens who might have perished under less organized conditions. 
There was still another form of survival enhancement the citizen could 
turn to, in times of need: the Reich services in the form of various 
Relief programs 
People survived air attacks also because of the government relief 
organizations.9,1 For the citizens who had lost their home and had nothing left 
but the clothes on their back, shock was minimized by the immediacy and 
efficiency of the government relief institutions which sprang into action as soon 
as the planes had left. These institutions were: 
the Department E of Health Matters and National Customs, 
the NSV, 
the NSDAP itself. 
People were never left homeless or without food if they followed 
prescribed procedures. To remind victims of bombing of the existing policy of 
governmental assistance, the Chief of Police issued an executive order, the 
"Order concerning war damages and procedures for answering claims." In it he 
pointed out that it was the special wish of the Fuehrer that the population hit by 
enemy air attacks "will be at least free from material worries."92 
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While the latter words would be considered an understatement by the 
most ardent believer in the Reich, it was at least true that the bombing victims 
were indeed provided with a great number of services : 
new living quarters for the "bombed-out," 
recovery of salvageable household goods from the ruins, 
clean-up of the site, so traffic would not be hindered, 
removal and depositing of tons of debris and the destruction of 
dangerous ruins. 
Rehousing of bombing victims93 
One priority after air attacks was immediate attention to the victims. 
Casualties had to be accounted for in a report, called "Enumeration of the 
wounded, taken ill [sic] or killed The report had to be forwarded immediately, 
marked "fiiegerbeschaedigt" --"air raid-damages" to the Central Registration 
Office, the District Registration Office or to the Office for Obituaries in the case of 
death, after which, other Reich institutions took over. 
Obtaining interim living quarters for "bombed-out" persons was relegated 
to the Homeless Registration Office (Obdachlosenanmeldestelle or "OS," to 
which victims were referred, according to a special directive.91 The NSDAP itself 
directed and applied this help to the citizens and appropriated and adapted for 
these purposes restaurants, coffeehouses, movie theaters, schools and other 
larger buildings to serve as interim living quarters. A school, for example, was 
large enough to house about 500, a restaurant about 150 and a movie theater 
about 1,200 people.96 
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Officials followed a specified procedure to aid victims of damaged or 
destroyed apartment houses.® Police brought citizens to an OS office where, if 
necessary, physicians were ready to tend to the wounded. Data was taken and 
the victims were counseled and immediately assigned and registered to their 
new living quarters, if they filled out a particular form, an official even went back 
to the damaged house for the purpose of retrieving household goods or 
vehicles. The owner could either accompany him, or the official would catalog 
items for later identification and put them in storage after entering everything on 
the appropriate list, complete with three copies. 
Victims could receive clothes and other necessities; payments of rent and 
even of their salaries would be made for them, if their working place had been 
shut down as a result of bomb damage. This office also issued a very important 
paper, the "proof of need" document,97 which enabled the victim to replace all 
rationing cards. These procedures in turn prompted another avalanche of forms 
to be filled out by shop owners who had to enter their new customers on the 
appropriate lists for Reich egg tickets, Reich milk tickets and Reich marmelade 
tickets and send a report for further registration to the State Nutrition Office. 
Sometimes, particularly high numbers of "bombed-out" homeless people 
confronted the officials. On Oct 17, 1944, for example, 6,192 people became 
homeless and on Nov 15, 1944, 13,402 people were rendered without a home. 
For the year 1944 altogether, which still saw less bombing than the beginning 
months of 1945, almost 64,000 people were rendered homeless. The total 
number of apartments lost through the air war, was 86,875.® Another source 
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cites 76,000 apartments destroyed and 101,000 damaged, and estimates the 
total Austrian war damages from the bombing (--transposed to the price level of 
1991/92) to be approximately $270 billion.® 
The Department E of Health Matters and National Customs was willing to 
provide services for the citizens in need, if the latter followed directions:100 
(1) The homeless were to go to collection points where they were to be 
fed and taken care of. They were to be given a shelter (in adapted movie 
theaters, schools, restaurants.) 
(2) They were not to depart without informing officials. 
(3) They were to always register with the police. 
(4) "Certificates of departure" were necessary when moving elswhere. It 
was important also for getting new ration cards and clothes-issue cards. 
Other functions of the Department E were:101 
(1) feeding and housing the bomb victims after air attacks, 
(2) rerouting of bomb victims to other cities, 
(3) sending children to the countryside,102 
(4) the building of birth clinics and homes for mothers with infants, 
(5) providing young mothers with additional help in immediate placement 
of their babies in nursery schools, 
(6) tending to wounded soldiers who had been sent to a Vienna 
hospital. This service was so extensive and so prescribed that it even 
had a regulation about the kind of presents to be supplied to the soldiers. 
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Debris disposal103 
The destruction by the bombing created also a number of other 
problems, such as traffic hmderances and endangering of public health. By the 
end of the war, the bombing had created 800,000 cubic meters of debris (about 
a million tons), the disposal of which required vehicles, gasoline, and an 
especially large work force. 
A separate problem was the re-use of the debris. The bombing victims 
tried to retrieve as much as they could and put it to new use. There was even a 
kind of systematic recycling, organized by a private company with the help of 
the city government. Metai was shredded, glass melted, bricks cleaned and 
reused. Aii these activities continued for some time, even after the war was 
over. 
A shortage of vehicles mads debris disposal difficult. Most vehicles of 
the city garbage disposal department were damaged and destroyed, in ali, 121 
trucks, 85 trailers, 232 specialty vehicles and 800 hand-buggies were lost. 
There was a lack of an adequate work force to repair the vehicles; and on top of 
it, the main city repair shop in the 20th district was hit in a bombing attack and 
rendered unusable. 
Clearing of the streets was a priority of the city government in order that 
traffic and daily activities could resume as soon as possible. At the end of the 
"all-clear" alarm, the population left their basements to survey the damage, if 
buildings in their neighborhood had been hit, they were confronted with piles of 
bricks, roof tiles, roof troughs, torn electrical wires, broken street car high wires, 
broken light poles and shattered glass. The view was traumatic, but besides a 
vision of destruction there could also be hidden time bombs or unexploded 
'""Kleine Bestaende Gruppe VI/82-1 ('Statistics"), p 22, City Archives. 
bombs lying several meters under the ground, wailing to be dug up and 
disposed. Sometimes the street had been transformed into a "carpet" of bomb 
craters which needed to be filled in and evened with the street surface. During 
the bombing period, 4620 craters were counted and repaired, quite often by the 
neighborhood people themselves who formed brigades and assisted each 
other in order to create "normal" conditions again as quickly as possible. Non- 
involved spectators were warned not to linger in the streets so as not to hinder 
ciean-up efforts; if the police found curiosity-seekers watching, the latter were 
quickly commandeered to join in on the clean-up operation. 
The significance of the air defense system lay not only in its design, its 
attention to detail, and its nationwide application, but in its enforcement 
provisions which were the responsibility of each local government. The Air 
Defense Law which regulated behavior under bombardment was a significant 
factor in saving lives and providing for those who needed help. The 
population's willingness to adherence to rules and regulations was in the end of 
great benefit. 
CHAPTER 3: THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF VIENNA 
. . . those, my Fuehrer, are the people . . . Their yearning is Germany! 
their faith is Germany! Their loyalty is Germany! Adolf Hitler, be their 
protector! For you are Germany! Our Germany! . . . 1CS 
Regardless of the seemingly overwhelming welcome Hitier had received 
from the population at his entrance into Vienna, on March 12, 1933,106 he was 
well aware that her integration into the Reich was not going to be easy. Hitler 
had a love-hate relationship with Vienna, a city that had treated him unkindly in 
the years from 1907 to 1914 when, at one time, he had to live in a shelter for 
homeless.1o7This city was different from its German counterparts. In April 1943, 
he voiced his disapproval of Vienna's population: "It was a mistake that I even 
received these Viennese into the Reich. I know these people. I have lived 
among them in my youth, they are enemies of Germany."105 
"The Austrian problem"l°9 was created by the disintegration of the 
Habsburg Empire by the end of World War I. Previously the prominent and 
dominating force in a large multinational empire, Austria was reduced to a 
small, insignificant country whose citizens now experienced a feeling of 
impotence. While the population had not yet fully come to accept the situation of 
the country, her status was altered, once again, by the Anschluss. Despite the 
105
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jubilant welcome Hitler had received at his entrance into the city, the beginning 
of the war had dampened considerably the enthusiasm of the population for its 
new regime.110 Vienna was certainly officially but not mentally integrated into the 
German Reich, as its citizens began to look upon the Germans as intruders. As 
the tides of war turned, greater disillusionment set in; and the beginning of the 
American bombing campaign further aggravated the ambivalent feelings of the 
population. 
While the Anschluss did not change the scope of city government nor its 
organizational structure, city administration now came to be controlled by the 
Nazi party system in a vertical as well as horizontal sense. It was difficult for the 
citizens to deal with the symbiotic relationship between the Nazi Party and the 
city government, since many party leaders were at the same time high state 
officials.111 Those higher Nazi officials who were transferred from Germany to the 
new Gau had to learn that they simply could not regard Vienna as a mere 
extension of Germany and the party, and that in order to achieve their aims in 
the city, it was best to make some allowances for the quirks of the Viennese 
mentality.112 
On August 2, 1940, still hoping to make real Germans out of the 
Viennese, he appointed Baldur von Schirach as the new Reichstatthalter and 
Gauleiter of Vienna,113 justifying his move by citing the mistakes of Schirach's 
1,0
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predecessor. Buercke!.114 "The situation in Vienna is dismal," he said in a 
conversation with Schirach, "Gauleiter Buercke! has not understood how to win 
over the Viennese to the Reich. I cannot afford in these times, to have a 
rebellious city in the South Eastern corner of the Reich. Somebody has to go to 
Vienna who possesses psychological tact." 
Hitler's worries about this southeastern outpost of the Reich seemed to 
confirm the general belief that Vienna was "different," that the priorities of the 
Viennese did not necessarily match those of the Germans, and that in Vienna 
cultural matters overrode other considerations. In his conversation with 
Schirach, Hitler blamed former Gauleiter Buerckel for having created an 
atmosphere "hostile to the Reich." If Buerckel's mistakes in carrying out the 
Aryanization project were not bad enough, Hitler said, the social faux pas he 
committed, were of even greater gravity: "He took off his jacket in the dining 
room of the Imperial Hotel and dined in suspenders. And in the Opera House, 
he occupied the VIP box in a business suit.""1' 
Hitler considered Schirach not only perfect for the position in Vienna 
because of Schirach's devotion to him, but also because of his cosmopolitan 
background. (He was born in Berlin to a theater director father and a wealthy 
American-born mother) Schirach came to understand that by considering the 
cultural wishes of the Viennese population and by appreciating their mentality 
he could gain their cooperation more easily in political matters. But even 
though the population obeyed imposed rules and regulations, Schirach was not 
able to prevent general disillusionment, particularly during the bombing 
"
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campaigns. As the bombing proceeded, Schirach increasingly was forced to 
walk a tightrope between humoring the Viennese population whose 
cooperation was of utmost importance, and pleasing Hitler whose goals and 
philosophy he was supposed to promote. It also became obvious that there 
were aspects of life in Vienna that the Nazi party couid not easily control. To 
Schirach's chagrin, he was blamed for the lack of enthusiasm for the war effort 
among the Viennese by other high Nazi officials and ultimately also by the 
Fuehrer himself. One of the leaders who disliked Schirach was the Minister for 
Culture and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, who in April 1943 had complained 
several times to Hitler about the Gauleiter's "Kulturpolitik;" it did not coincide at 
al! with Goebbels' tastes. 
On April 22, 1943, in a conversation with war Minister Albert Speer, Hitler, 
then prone to blaming his lieutenants for disastrous events, expressed his 
fears that Schirach "had lost his clear view of the interest of the Reich." 1,6 
Because of its background and tradition as the capita! city of a former 
major multinational empire, the Viennese not only took great pride in their 
cultural life, especially in their music and theater which matched world 
standards, but also in the excellent infrastructure and public services of the city. 
Because ambitious people from the different nations of the former empire had 
gravitated to the capital city in a quest for better opportunities, their diversified 
skills ana experiences had enhanced Vienna's professional world. The greater 
competition for jobs resulted in an excellent, multilingual administration and 
well- organized city services, such as the police-, fire- and public transportation 
departments. 
Ich glaubte. p 295. 
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The general war situation presented more than enough problems for the 
city government to maintain essential day-to-day services, preserve the cultural 
life of the city and guarantee the smooth operation of a functioning bureaucracy. 
But the persistent bombing that began in 1944 confronted the city government 
with an added, new, and complex challenge: 
Prompted by the deteriorating situation at the front and the decision of 
the Allies to carry out renewed bombing of German cities, this time also 
including Vienna, Hitler proclaimed a new phase of the war, that of a "total war 
effort:""7 
The war situation forces us to implement the full utilization of all 
forces of the Wehrmacht and armament; therefore I order the 
chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Reich defense, Reich 
Marshal Hermann Goering, to adjust the whole public life to the 
necessities of total war effort, in every regard. All public events 
have to view as a goal the total war effort . . . The whole state 
apparatus, including Reich railroads, post and all public 
institutions and organizations have to be adjusted to meet the 
goal of a total rational effort ["Einsatz"] of people and means . . . 
so that the highest potential of forces for the Wehrmacht and 
armament is available. 
As a result, Viennese citizens had to confront not only the strained 
conditions of hazardous bombing but also the harrassment of "total war" 
sanctions. The total war effort campaign became the Nazi government's most 
intense focus. Its swift, sweeping and severe implementation engulfed all facets 
of daily life; its implication for the citizens involved a number of added 
discomforts and sacrifices as their cooperation was requested regarding: 
Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBI.) # 34/1944, Berlin, July 27,1944, Folder 1-123. acc. nr. 3387, 
Haus- Hof- urxd Staatsarchrv (City Archives). 
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(1) the continuation and enforcement of war production 
(2) the Volkssturm (Home Guard) and Labor Services 
(3) public services and aid programs 
(4) the general work force 
(5) the curtailing of cultural life 
(6) nutrition and health matters.118 
Continuation of war production 
As Adolf Hitler insisted in his proclamation of total war, the production of 
weapons was to be continued at all costs. To ammunition factory workers, this 
was nothing new as they were constantly urged on by circulated letters of the 
NSDAP -- Gauleitung Vienna , such as the following: 
Our enemies who cannot conquer us in an open fight and in the 
battles on the front, are now trying to break the morale of our 
population and to interrupt the production of goods, important for 
the war, by brutal terror-attacks on the cities of our homeland. It is 
therefore imperative for every factory to see to it that the greatest 
obstacles are overcome and that armament potential is not only 
maintained but production is increased . . . Preparedness is 
everthing. Reichsleiter and Reichsstatthalter Baldur v. Schirach 
has created extensive measures for protection. In maintaining 
production, we want to stand fully and totally on his side. However 
hard fate may touch us, we will be harder and will suffer through. 
We are protecting our city, which we love with all our heart, and we 
are maintaining unconditionally the production capacity of our 
factories in order to deliver weapons to the front and to continue 
production of the products important for the achievement of victory. 
. . The Fuehrer expects from us the highest degree of readiness 
and we give it willingly, because the final goal of this world war is a 
free Germany."9 
"
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And indeed, armament production continued in the whole Reich, and 
despite heavy bombing reached its maximum in the fall of 1944.120 In Vienna, 
damaged factory buildings were repaired as rapidly as possible in order to 
maintain the volume of war materials produced; production also was moved 
somewhere else, to tunnels, into forests and to the countryside. All means of 
transponation were kept running as long as possible. Consequently, in 1944, 
450,000 people were employed as members of the German Labor Front in war 
production in Vienna.121 Conscripted reluctantly like the soldiers on the war 
front, they contributed to the war effort. Armament production in Austria 
reached its zenith in the Fall of 1944,122 despite the fact that transport of 
resources and manpower became more and more difficult. 
Already in 1938, a plan was created to integrate Austria into German 
armament production. On March 26, 1938, Hermann Goering announced from 
the lobby of the Vienna North West Railway Station his "Build-up Program for 
Austria," which emphasized the build-up of an armament industry and the 
utilization of Austrian raw materials. And Goering was not shy in reminding the 
Austrians that they were the ones who were supposed to do the work. "One 
should not think in Austria," he said in the railway station, "that men would 
come from the Reich to take up the work and set the table for the Austrians.'-123 
On the contrary, he would see to it that the Austrians utilized their own 
workforce to capacity. 
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Austria's industry before the war consisted of "peace-time" factories, 
producing consumer goods; there was littie heavy industry until the Reich, at 
the beginning of 1942, transferred some of its armament factories and outlets to 
Austria and intensified this move in 1943 and 1944; but even then factories 
were rather sparse.ist These transfers had the effect of making Austria a more 
important target for bombing. 
The Austrian economist Ferdinand Tremel acknowledges125 that in 
addition to the few armament plants in the country, there existed small firms that 
were moved into apartment houses as a way of secretly continuing war 
production. Information about these small armament production plants in 
apartment houses supposedly had been transmitted to the Allies and the 
planning staff of the bomber raids. Camouflaged as children day care centers, 
scientific and social institutions, these small factories were engaged in 
production in the middle of housing areas. Because of the Allied intelligence's 
information however, the civilians became more vulnerable as their houses 
were bombarded. But, Tremel maintains, the small factory outlets did not have a 
great impact on the overall Reich war production; instead, railroads and oil 
facilities presented more valuable targets. 
In 1943, sixty percent of the Reich oil production came already from 
Austrian oil fields,12 and the 15th AAF was able to neutralize these sources as 
well as oil depots early in the air war.127 The two first major attacks occurred on 
Ferdinand TrRmfil WirtRchafts- and Sozialaeschichte Oasterreich? (Vienna: Franz 
Deuticke, 1969), pp 391-2. 
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June 16 and June 26, 1944, with a concentration on the refineries of 
Moosbierbaum, but also of Korneuburg, Schwechat and, located within the city, 
Vienna-Kagran and Vienna-Floridsdorf. After further attacks on July 8, July 25, 
and August 28, 1944, the damage was severe enough to seriously hamper the 
Nazi war effort. 
Volkssturm (Home Guard) 
The mobilization of the Volkssturm was another means for the city 
government to increase the contributions of Vienna to the war effort. On August 
16, 1944, the following document, stamped "classified," and "not to be 
published," was sent to party officials:"123 
I order the leaders of the party-offices to prepare the necessary 
arrangements for the total war effort. They are authorized to close 
offices, partially or totally, and to use those freed (human) sources 
for war-essential activities or offer thern to the Wehrmacht and 
armament. 
Fuehrerhauptquartier Munich, July 20,1944, signed: Adolf Hitler. 
"Those freed sources," which Hitler mentioned, were to be used tor "war- 
essential activities" by making them reluctant members of the Volkssturm. Thus, 
they joined other men, conscripted from those above and below draft age and 
those who because of a "lack of ability or other war-important employment" did 
not belong to a fighting force. As propaganda tried to impress on them, they 
were now, like their brothers at the front, "soldiers of the homeland," defending 
126
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their home city.129 Later, betore and during the siege of Vienna, the Volkssturm 
performed necessary preparatory services for resisting the Soviet invading 
forces, such as digging trenches and erecting barricades, as weil as actual 
hand-to-hand fighting in the streets. 
Some of the rules that applied to the status of a Volkssturm member 
were:130 
(1) Service in the Volkssturm had priority over service in all other 
organizations, although membership in non-job-related organizations 
was not affected. 
(2) The Guard's military organization and outfitting was the 
responsibility of the Waffen-SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler.131 
(3) Every member was required to attend a 5-day course of instruction.132 
Many members of the Volkssturm were reluctant draftees from the work 
force, since each work place had to make a certain number of people available 
to participate in the force. It didn't matter much what type of work the person 
previously had performed. For all practical purposes, to be drafted into the 
Vokssturm by an employer, equaled a kind of demotion and often fell on citizens 
who did not openly glorify the Reich, who were looked upon suspiciously, and 
who did not know anybody in the hierarchy who could change their fate. It was 
not unusual to draft intellectuals -a case in point being Professor Dr. 
Liebscher, until then the director of a scientific research institute, who was 
129
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recruited to be the ieadei of a Volkssturm battalion, in charge of border 
security.133 
Propaganda glorified the Volkssturm, as it did all the other measures of 
the Reich. Citizens could listen to speeches coming over the radio at home or in 
the basement shelters, if there was a lull in the noise of the bombing, as the 
Party initiated the Volkssturm's creation with the necessary pomp. In addition, 
the press supported and enhanced Hitler's proclamation of the event. Under 
the headline "Call to the German Nation", a Viennese newspaper reported: 
In the hour when the force of the enemy sweeps over all the fronts, with 
the declared aim of smashing the Reich with its abundant people and 
material and destroying the German nation, the Fuehrer raises his voice 
and appeals to the whole nation to resist and fight with all possible 
means.--The Fuehrer orders the formation of the German Volkssturm! .. . 
I order that in the regions of the Great German Reich, the German 
Volkssturm, composed of all able-bodied men, aged 16-60 years, is to 
be organized, for the purpose of defending the home ground with all 
weapons and all means. The structure and the leadership of the German 
Volkssturm will be handled by the regional leaders, utilizing the 
institutions of the existing institutions of the party, the SA, the Waffen-SA 
and the HJ. The members of the German Volkssturm are during their 
deployment soldiers according to the military law.134 
Heinrich Himmler's speech on the following day further described the 
Volkssturm agenda: 
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Voikssturmmaenner! 
Today, on the . . . 131st anniversary of the "Battle of Nations in Leipzig," 
our Fuehrer and highest "war lord" has called all able-bodied German 
men between the ages of 16 and 60, still at home, to be deployed to the 
German Volkssturm in order to defend the home ground. . . In soldier-like 
calmness, so typical for our faithful and brave German nation, shall we, 
men and women, having withstood courageously and unshakably, five 
war years on the front and in the homeland, . . .help the Wehrmacht in 
endangered regions . . . Outwardly and inwardly we will prepare 
ourselves for this duty. We swear that, like our fathers, we will be faithful; 
faithful to the Fuehrer, sent to us by Our Lord, faithful to the Reich, which 
has united all German tribes after centuries, representing the power of 
order of the European continent, now and in the future, faithful to the 
nation and therefore to ourselves, and . . . [we will] defend our nation.,a6 
Labor Services'36 
Already in 1935, the Compulsory Labor Service Law was enacted, which 
obligated each young German citizen to serve, in the public interest, for six 
months in one of the Labor Services, which contained further specified 
branches, such as: 
the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) - Reich employment service, 
the Kriegshilfsdienst -- war effort aid service, and 
the Erntehilfe --harvest aid. 
These particular services had not only an economic impact but often 
served to provide the essentials for survival. 
Women piayed a special role in the Reich Labor Services where, in 
addition to regular duties, they displayed their resilience, as well as their 
physical and emotional strength by performing work that had formerly been 
Kleine Wiener Krieaszeitunq. October 19,1944, pi, c 2-3, and p 2-4, c 1-3. 
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done by men. Never before had women, though active, been lhat visible in the 
work force, except in traditionally feminine professions, such as nurses, 
teachers, seamstresses, maids, etc. Recruited for these services, most often to 
their chagrin, they were called "Kriegsdienstmaiden," -"war service maids"137 
and worked in the country outside of Vienna as well as in municipal jobs, such 
as driving street cars or punching tickets. Many young, unmarried women were 
drafted to do housework in farm homes in the country. Adhering to the 60-hour 
week prescribed in the Kriegseinsatz order, the hours were as grueiing as the 
circumstances were difficult. 
Numerous orders and memos to various Reich offices were sent daily by 
high officials, both German and Austrian, such as the Reichsstatthalter of 
Vienna himself, to remind bureau heads of utilizing work forces to the fullest, in 
both the private economy as well as the public. A typical letter was sent to "the 
highest Reich institutions" on August 19, 1944: 
The work force is our most precious resource! Its full utilization is 
therefore the goal of the total war effort. Our motive has to be based on 
the principle that the largest possible effort has to be attempted with the 
least possible work forces. Heil Hitler! Signed: Dr. Goebbels."133 
Public services and aid programs 
To keep the city functioning properly during the bombardment, great 
efforts were required. Adherence to rules and regulations was often only 
possible by the utilization of practical sense, imagination and presence of mind 
in carrying them out. 
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Public transportation 
Vienna's well-organized public transportation system of a wide network 
of streetcars, buses and subways, came to a standstill as soon as the cuckoo 
call (the warning signal of the air defense system) was heard. Everybody, 
including streetcar employees, had to seek shelter, abandoning the streetcars 
on the tracks. It took a while before service could be reinstated because tracks 
had to be cleared and electrical lines sorted out and repaired. 
"If you had to perform work in various parts of the city, as I did," Karoline 
Ledinegg recalls,"139 "you relied, like a lot of other citizens, on your own two feet. 
Because not many people owned a telephone at that time, my route was spread 
over the whole city and I found myself sometimes on its outskirts when the 
bombing attack was over. Rather than waiting, I would start walking home." 
As gasoline-powered trucks, city and commercial vehicles, were 
gradually put out of action through successful bombing and fuel shortages, the 
streetcar system turned out to be the most resilient means of transportation and 
came to handle various utilitarian functions.140 It served as the vehicle for "Just 
married" couples, -unless they were walking--, as well as - ironically-- for 
transporting the dead to the cemeteries. As bombing attacks became more 
frequent, the latter function prevailed over the former. Streetcars were also used 
for commercial purposes, such as the transport of general commodities. When 
there were trucks available, but without the necessary fuel, trucks were hitched 
to and pulled by streetcars. The shortage of fuel inspired citizens who still 
possessed a private vehicle, to come up with their own method of fuel 
139
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production. A wood burning stove, attached to the end of the car, was 
sometimes utilized to power these vehicles. 
Clean up activities 
The devastation after an air attack had to be followed by intensive clean¬ 
up activities by city workers before regular services could be reinstated. Even if 
there was no major bomb damage, there were almost always minor effects, 
such as damages caused by the air pressure of a bomb's detonation and the 
impact of objects of all kinds flying through the air. Cracked furniture and blown- 
out windows were common occurrences, although considered less 
inconvenient than damages to the water canals, water system, gas pipes and 
electrical lines. 
Canal network and water supply141 
One of the worst side effects of the bombings was damage to the water 
canal system. Damage also caused sewage water to overflow into the streets 
and sometimes to flood the basements which were used as shelters. Even 
though about 400 workers from 14 contracting firms were continuously 
employed to repair the canals, new breaks occurred as fast as the old ones 
were taken care of. Breaks in canals, including the ones which became 
apparent only after the war, amounted to more than 1600. The water supply 
was constantly in danger. Since Vienna received its water from high altitude 
sources in the Lower Austrian mountains of the Schneeberg, Rax and 
Hochschwab, there were numerous targets which could be bombed by the 
enemy planes. Major arteries leading to Vienna, were hit many times but were 
always repaired as quickly as possible. Often, when a major pipe or a large 
Statistics compiled by Statistics Director, Karl Pospischil, box 82-85, City Archives. 
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water container was hit, whole brooks gushed through the streets until the water 
could be contained. 
On February 21, 1S45, 70% of Vienna's water supply was interrupted, ^ 
as 160 single incidences of damage were counted. Even though workers 
worked day and night to repair the damage, the next day Vienna was still 
without water. As in similar incidents before, a few old-fashioned water wells still 
located in the inner courts of some apartment buildings provided relief, but 
getting the water home was a major task. Karoline Ledinegg recalls many a 
day when she went to the well of the Grosse Stadtgutgasse, a few blocks away 
from her home: 
"People were standing in a long line, with pails of all sizes, 
sometimes for hours. It took so long to let a pail down and get it up 
again; for some reason the windlass worked only very slowly ; 
there wasn't a thing one could do. I remember one woman whose 
pail leaked, but it was all she had. I wondered whether she would 
have anything left in the pail, by the time she reached home. But 
one couldn't buy simple household items; there weren't any in the 
stores. And of course, hauling a full water pail back to my place, 
then up five flights of stairs, was not pleasant either; but I was 
young and strong; the older, weaker people were the ones who 
found themselves in dire straits."143 
Aid programs 
Aside from the regular services the city government provided during the 
bombing period, there were numerous programs which aided the citizen in 
emergency situations. The ones which dealt specifically with bomb victims have 
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been already discussed in a previous chapter. There were also social services, 
dealing with the effects of bombing which were run by city officials under the 
auspices of the NSV,144 a party organization. The NSV addressed particularly 
women and children and ran various programs, such as the 
Transportation of children to the countryside.145 
Not every citizen was in favor of this rather controversial program, which 
was not obligatory. While it was meant to protect children from the air raids by 
sending them to the countryside which was generally spared the attacks, the 
children were taken from their home by NSV social workers and thus separated 
from their mothers. As most men were fighting in the field, mothers held 
responsibility for their offspring and resented a separation from their children. 
Many also feared unwanted Nazi indoctrination of their children. Those who 
entered the program were taken to the country where they lived in camps run 
by the social workers of the NSV who watched over the childrens' every day- 
activities such as learning and playing in a strictly regulated and prescribed 
manner, enhanced by frequent singing of Nazi hymns and songs.1,16 
There was no question though about the government's promptness, 
efficiency and thoroughness in general. Although considered "routine" in peace 
times, these attributes served now as an indication to the citizens that despite 
the mayhem caused by the bombing, life could go on as "normally" as possible 
and that citizens could always rely on their government to make life bearable. If 
they only filled out the right forms, all would be well. In the midst of bombs 
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raining down on the city, there was a certain security in holding on to the things 
that people were used to, even if it was only that of traditional bureaucracy. 
Thus, the regime had its constituents firmly in its hands. 
Was there anything left to the citizens? Yes, there was. The population of 
Vienna rose to its challenge in many ways and responded to the bombing 
period as best as it could; it was a matter of survival. 
CHAPTER 4 : THE POPULATION: 
DUTY, DEPENDENCY, DETERMINATION 
German men and women! 
The homeland knows no greater duty and prouder obligation 
than to serve the front! It is the invincible source of strength and 
the gigantic arsenal for the Army.147 
Whether the citizens agreed with this official propaganda or not, their 
lives had become a day-to-day struggle to survive. By necessity, as the war in 
the air dragged on, the Viennese found themselves caught in a pattern of 
fulfilling duties, dependent on services provided by the government, and 
forced, at the same time, to rely more and more on their own determination and 
skills to survive. These elements of duty, dependency and determination came 
to govern the lives of the citizens in the years of bombardment, as inescapable 
as the war itself. 
With the implementation of the declaration on total war effort, on July 26. 
1944, everyday life became harder. A new age-segment of the population was 
sent to the front and the "UK"148 status was abolished; men with the birth year of 
1906 as well as the ones categorized "indispensable," were conscripted. By 
August 8, 1944, even men with a birth year of 1884 were drafted. At the same 
time, young males, born in 1928, rather than --as before-1926, were required 
to join the Voikssturm. The rest of the population, while remaining at home, was 
147 Excerpt of speech of Hermann Goering, Propaganda Minister. Kleine Wiener Voikszeitunq. 
November 20,1939. 
148 UK = "unabkoemmlich" -- indispensable. 
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expected to "sacrifice" more than ever before, and was asked to scale down life 
to the barest necessities. It was all in the interest of the war; and it hit the men 
and women of the work force the hardest. 
Working conditions for employees and employers changed drastically, in 
accordance with the Decree on Total War Effort: The minimum work week was 
now, instead of the former forty-eight and a half hours, sixty hours per week. If 
more was required at a particular work place, work took place also on Sundays. 
If employers didn't fully utilize their work force, they were to be severely 
punished. If, for any reason, a person could not work the long hours, he or she 
could petition the Reichsstatthalter for relief. If somebody was hindered 
because of a health condition, he or she had to submit a doctor's confirmation. 
Many desk-officials of state offices, such as the forestry and wood-working 
bureau, the state nutrition office, and others, were now reassigned to work in 
ammunition factories and other war-related firms; personnel directors were 
constantly inundated with directives to free their employees for more important 
war duties. 
"Our work force is our most precious resource and its full utilization is the 
goal of our total war,"149 was a phrase employers and employees could read in 
the letter of Reich spokesperson Dr. Stuckart, dated August, 23, 1944. Citizens 
were drafted for "emergency obligations," which could involve work in 
ordinance or transportation factories, like "Simmering-Graz-Pauker," or in 
"Schanzarbeiten," -digging trenches,which was preparational work for the final 
defense of the city.150 
III a 5275/44/6450.Police Archives. 
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Some citizens felt the control of the government more than others. If they 
were not lucky enough to already have and be retained in a decent job, they did 
not have any more freedom in choosing their work than they had in avoiding 
the bombing. An important device of this control by the government was the 
"Arbeitsbuch," the "Work Book," which each worker had to possess.15' The book 
served as a statistical account of the labor supply for the government; and each 
employee was under obligation to have it instantly ready for inspection of data 
relevant to his job.'52 Often it documented arbitrary removal of citizens, 
particularly intellectuals, from their regular position to one of war-related work. 
One such case concerns a Vienna priest and music professor who was 
commandeered to South Styria in order to dig trenches.153 
If anybody dared to object to such an order, he put himself in jeopardy. 
Any citizen, who was found working against any clause of the "total war effort," 
would be swiftly punished. If it was perceived that the perpetrator caused 
particular danger or endangered the security of the Reich, he could be even 
punished with a life sentence or with death.154 Nowhere was the inhumanity of 
punishment for political reasons revealed more horribly than in the words of 
Reichsfuehrer of the SS, Heinrich Himmler who, in cold bureaucratic lingo, 
informed Party officials of one of their collegues' execution who got his just 
punishment for his defeatist remarks," and then signed his name with strokes as 
hard and ominous as the cut of an ax.is 
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In addition to the citizens' duty as a member of the workforce, they also 
had the duty to protect themselves, as prescribed by law. Whether they were at 
home or at the work place, as soon as they heard the air raid alarm, they were 
obliged to trudge obediently to a shelter; a few months into the bombing, this 
"duty of self protection" turned into a kind of conditioned behavior. 
"It became routine to do certain things when the air raid alarm sounded," 
Karoline Ledinegg says,156 like grabbing the little suitcase with the important 
papers and documents, as well as shutting off gas pilots,157 and leaving a 
window cracked. It just made sense." And so it went. 
It was drilled into the citizens' minds that following the rules was 
advantagious not only for their own survival but also would help them avoid 
punishment in the case of negligence; failure to act as required could result in 
serious consequences. A Willi Havel was sentenced to three months of prison, 
for violating paragraph 81 of the Code of Law and paragraph 9 of the Air 
Defense Law, for refusing to seek protection in a shelter.13 Apparently, he could 
not prove that he fell under the exemption rules, which applied to those on their 
way to important work. Negligence of one's citizenship "duties" could even be 
considered as sabotage of the Reich. There existed a set of penalties and fines 
for the citizen who disobeyed the air defense laws. Police could arrest people 
on the street if they were found there during an air raid; violators of the 
blackout rules were not only punished with a monetary fine, but were 
threatened with a cut-off of their electricity.156 
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Since a strong work ethic existed among the population by tradition, the 
duty to work was hardly ever questioned. It did not occur to people not to go to 
work because of unsafe conditions. Up until the end of the war, they went to 
their places of employment where they continued to perform badly needed 
work. Whether it was the repair of streetcars or tracks which were restored as 
fast as they were again destroyed, or the delivery of mail or a public service, 
tended to by thousands of postal workers, city employees, and people like the 
telephone meter reader, Karoline Ledinegg, or duties performed by office 
workers and other professionals, they stuck it out. Some turned to other types of 
work, when their own place was destroyed; but all in all, they did it because of 
their traditional work ethic, their respect for authority and their desperate 
attempt to hold on to something "normal", and the hope that it all would end 
eventually. 
Added to the citizens' obligations of work under the trying circumstances 
of the bombing was the regimentation of leisure time.1® The Nazi regime 
prescribed entertainment and enlightenment in the form of radio, cinema, 
newspapers, magazines and sport, all under the control of the propaganda 
machine, and infiltrated work places with their social organisations. The 
German Labor Front161 created the slogan "Strength through Joy," and staged 
efficiency competitions. The infamous "Arbeit macht Freude," -- Work gives 
pleasure," ended up as a motto atop the entrance of concentration camps, and 
carried this propaganda ad absurdum. 
"" Behemoth, p 349-51. 
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While the government received cooperation from its citizens, it also 
made sure that the young were properly prepared and made them subject to 
various state programs. All German and Austrian schools were placed under 
the domination of the Nazi party.162 The Party, by controlling the educational 
system, could indoctrinate children at an early age. Since, traditionally, 
education played an important part in Austria, steps were taken to continue 
classes during the bombing phase of the war.163 When the air raid sirens 
sounded, children under the tutelage of their teachers proceeded in an orderly 
fashion to the shelter. Some schools, for all practical purposes, were moved 
underground, as was the University of Vienna. For a time, children were taught 
wherever it was safe in shelters, but as fear and chaotic conditions increased, 
in the last months of the war, sessions of regular classes were no longer 
possible. By Christmas 1944, the daily alarms, frequent attacks and the 
especially low temperatures of a harsh winter prompted the authorities to 
declare a "cold-vacation," which came to an end only in April 1945 when the 
war ended. In addition to their schooling, children were incorporated into the 
"Hitler Youth." By executive order of March 25, 1939, a Youth Service Duty for 
German youth between the ages of ten and eighteen was introduced, and by 
1943, was made as compulsary as school attendance.161 The law said that 
parents who encouraged their children to abstain from this service duty were 
punishable, and their children might be taken away from their homes and put 
into orphanages or with other families. All organized youth activities, "duties" as 
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well as "pleasures", such as sport and music, were in fact carried out 
throughout the whole bombing period. 
Dependency 
As the citizen obeyed orders and participated in government-instituted 
services, he became more and more dependent on the regime which had put 
him into this situation in the first place. If he was lucky, he never needed 
services like rehousing or access to a birth clinic for his pregnant wife, but he 
was totally dependent upon the rationing system for food and clothing. 
Ironically, the bombing kept citizens dependent on a regime that the air 
attacks were trying to destroy; and the bombing only fortified the population's 
dependency on the government. Allied military strategists speculated at one 
time that bombing could lead to such demoralization of citizens that they would 
turn on their government and sabotage it to the point where the Allies could 
easily subdue and conquer the country, thus ending the war.166 But if the Allies 
ever hoped that the citizens would rise against their government, how could 
this be done under condition's created by the bombing when the population 
needed the government the most? 
Determination 
Determination was perhaps the strongest motivation of the population. 
This determination was not restricted to mere physical survival but included 
inventive ways to overcome hardships in the following areas: 
the lack of basic household items and food, 
the drab every-day life, curtailed from any kind of frills or cultural life, 
the often long time spent in shelters during bombing. 
'"Chester Wilmot. The Struaoie for Europe. (NewYork: Harper& Row, 1952) , p 550. Also: 
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Citizens embraced every opportunity to cut corners and scrounge 
around for the most basic items needed for existence. Once household items 
were destroyed, they usually could not be replaced. Because of the previous 
five years' emphasis on an armament-oriented industry, "peace-items" were 
practically non-existent in Austria. There was a shortage of wood, glass, nails, 
and most other every-day items,1® but the improvisations of citizens struggling 
to survive were almost limitless. Karoline Ledinegg remembers, "I shared some 
thumbtacks with a collegue of mine so she could put up the big sheet of brown 
packing paper she had found at a bombing site to replace her shattered 
window glass. And if one of us could get an extra half pint of milk for the 
children, the only glass bottle to pick it up with was carefully washed out and 
then used by several other mothers in turn."157 
Despite the food rationing system, the goal of which was to prevent later 
starvation, survival on the extremely small ration portions was almost 
impossible and it was no secret that just about all citizens tried with more or less 
success to add to their rations through other sources. Those were:168 
(1) farming, on the outskirts of the city; 
(2) small gardening; about 35,000 people owned diminutive garden 
plots, separate from their apartment, somewhere in Vienna, all in ail 
about ten million square meters. "Amateur farmers" grew fruits and 
vegetables, and also raised chickens and rabbits; 
(3) "collecting;" citizens would go into the country after the harvest and 
collect whatever they could still find on the ground. There were grain 
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seekers who, after gathering wheat, barley, or other grains, would thresh 
it themselves or grind the seeds with coffee grinders, and potato seekers. 
"They always carried their booty in a 'Rucksack,' an item as treasured as 
the potatoes themselves," says Karoline Ledinegg, "but I did one better: I 
got potatoes from a farmer in a small bag, placed it, flattened out, on an 
old stroller and spread a blanket over the bag. I then had my small 
daughter ride on it, while I pushed the buggy home, over a distance of 
about 25 kilometers.",69 Finally, there were berry-, mushroom- and herb 
seekers. 
(4) vacation-work; people used their vacation time to work at a farm, 
where their salary would be paid in food. This method was legal; 
(5) buying of groceries in addition to rations. This took place, of course, 
on the black market, which was illegal; 
(6) bartering; this was also illegal but despite of that, everything that 
could be moved was exchanged for food. Clothes, sewing machines, 
even pianos were hauled to the country; 
(7) food packages; if one had an acquaintance on a farm, he would try to 
obtain little extras. Says Karoline Ledinegg: "I don't know what I would 
have done without my foster brothers in Styria; they sent me ham, lard, 
even eggs, by mail, which always arrived whole; only rarely, one or two 
would be cracked."170 
As if the daily struggle for the basics was not enough, the implementation 
of the total war effort brought yet another hardship with major implications on 
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the people: the curtailing of cultural life.'71 Even though a war brings with it 
shortages, sacrifices and losses, the American bombing only served to 
reinforce Hitler's notion on citizens of the need for a total war effort. According to 
this notion, by sacrificing even the last amenity left, the citizens could show the 
aggressors that they could carry on with their lives, and that every sacrifice they 
made in terms of material and human resources would only enhance means to 
conquer the enemy. 
That was the theory. Reality for the citizens looked slightly different: a little 
entertainment went a long way to sustain people's spirit. To give up that and 
other elements of their lives which were ingrained with culture was one of the 
worst blows citizens suffered. Many blamed these conditions on the Americans 
and their bombing: "There was a marked difference in our lives, once the 
bombing started regularly," Karoline Ledinegg remembers.172 "Before the 
bombing, despite the usual wartime shortages, life pretty much resembled 
peacetime, but the bombing put everybody and everything under its spell." 
In 1944, the measure which ordered the closing of theaters, concert halls 
and places of entertainment was presented to the mayor of Vienna, Herr 
Blaschke, in the form of a letter from a party official, a Dr. Benecke from Berlin: 
Dear friend, 
Reductions in cultural life have been decided upon by the Fuehrer 
personally. Suggested by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels, the Fuehrer has 
ordered the closing of all theaters. In old friendship, Heil Hitler! Your Otto 
Benecke.173 
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This was a move looked upon with alarm by many citizens, who had 
always considered cultural activities an important aspect of their lives. But the 
sacrifice and dissappointment was not entirely theirs; those who actively 
provided for the cultural activities, felt harrasserf as well. An official executive 
order proclaimed that all men and women belonging to the Reich Culture 
Chambers or associations and all other persons who were now free from their 
professional obligations after the closing of theaters were required to report to 
the unemployment office by Sept 15,1944.17i Many Burg Theater actors or 
Vienna State Opera stars found themselves following an invitation to the 
unemployment office and pondering the directions of yet another form to be 
filled out in accordance with the above directive, which reassured them that 
"unemployed citizens can declare for which employment they consider 
themselves particularly able." Those refusing could be "forcibly brought" to the 
unemployment office and punished by prison and a monetary fine. 
The second level of "cultural" closings involved some simple restaurants 
and coffee houses. Following this, the mayor of Vienna suggested self service 
and a simplification of menu items in the remaining establishments,175 ironically 
so, it seems, because there wasn't much variety of food to begin with. By 
October, 1944, all entertainment establishments were closed;176 public dancing 
("Tanzlustbarkeiten") was to cease "until further notice," as proclaimed by 
Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, and finally, even the use of 
libraries was ordered reduced ("lending necessities" were permitted.) There 
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was one exception: cinemas were still allowed to remain open. They served 
propaganda, as movies produced under Nazi supervision were cleverly used 
in an attempt to brainwash citizens into becoming followers. 
With no "entertainment" left to possibly interfere with the war effort, the 
people had to oblige with more work; what else could they do? They might have 
been only vaguely aware that even the Fuehrer himself got to taste the fruits of 
equal suffering. At an invitation to tea in the house of Josef Goebbels and his 
wife, he presented Frau Goebbels with " a modest bunch" of lilies-of-the-valley, 
and explained that it was "the best that could be found, because Doctor 
Goebbels had closed all the flower shops in Berlin."177 
Again and again, officials repeatedly hammered into citizens' heads that 
if they would only sacrifice everything mundane and focus their energies 
toward one goal only, namely the promotion of the war effort, the war would be 
eventually won. Furthermore, the citizens would survive to see it happen. The 
population's determination to cope with the bombing brought forth human 
survival traits. People often took their own initiatives, using what the 
government could not give them --hope, faith and love for their fellow 
neighbors. Tenants of apartment houses became aware that they were a 
community and could overcome obstacles more easily with everybody's 
cooperation; as the bombings increased and the shelters were frequented with 
greater regularity, the inhabitants took steps to make basements more 
"livable."178 Regulations aside, many people thought of ways to make living in 
basements easier. An empty coal box, for example, was perfect for storing 
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emergency items in the form of cans and bottles or jugs with water. One very 
practical container which was stuffed with survival items was the "German 
Rucksack," made of strong tent material, which could be easily picked up and 
carried around, in case of a quick flight. 
As the war neared the end and bombardments increased from day to 
day, more and more meals had to be taken in basements. To prepare them, 
tenants brought small wood-burning ovens or petroleum cookers with them. By 
contributing whatever food items they could scratch up, they created in the 
process "culinary war-time delights," which became known as the "community 
goulash, " the "war cake," and the "potato cake." Even Mrs. Goebbels herself, in 
a radio broadcast, revealed her recipe for a soup, made from potato peels.173 
Karoline Ledinegg remembers another "fine specialty" from the final 
phase of the war when the system of rationing cards went astray.At the 
beginning of April 1945, when the Soviets were already in Vienna, bombs and 
artillery fire made the people hover in their cellars continuously for the second 
straight week, and food was getting frightfully scarce. Two tenants who had 
restlessly strayed outside in the neighboring streets brought back some 
unexpected "booty:" sticking out of pails were the raw parts of a horse, its blood 
still dripping and forming a puddle on the ground. The dead animal had been 
left on the street, after fierce street battles with the Soviets."1® 
There were countless other occasions during which the citizens had to 
make quick and important decisions and rely on their own instincts, based on 
their determination to survive. Many episodes of cooperation among total 
"'Ibid. 
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strangers and displays of loyalty to neighbors as well as their home city 
occurred. When the Opera House was destroyed, famous opera stars were 
seen cleaning up and scratching through the debris in order to retrieve and 
preserve notes, instruments and precious costumes. Against all odds, the 
Viennese opera singer Ernst Majkut, together with two other employees of the 
House, dragged a grand piano down the main staircase in order to save it.181 
In their struggle to overcome the hardship of the bombing, the Viennese 
population resigned themselves to the fact that it was after all war; but while the 
targeting of industrial sites and even housing areas could be considered 
justified to a certain degree, the destruction of cultural institutions, as well as 
schools, churches and hospitals, was much harder to digest. If the damages of 
homes as well as industrial and transportation sites, --all existing railway 
stations were either damaged or destroyed by the end of the war-182 were 
tragic and disturbing, the Viennese population was shocked by the destruction 
of some of the great cultural institutions of the city.183 
To see the magnificent royal castles of Schoenbrunn and Belvedere, the 
precious palaces of Schwarzenberg, Kaunitz and Harrach, and great 
monuments, such as the Kunsthistorische Museum and the Burg Theater, 
destroyed and mutilated, filled the people with rage, sadness and disbelief. 
Aside from their own personal losses, that was what they questioned the most. 
Who was served by the obliteration of treasures which provided enjoyment and 
elevation for the whole world? What could be the motive for such a thing? 
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One early heavy air attack, on September 10, 1944, directed mostly 
towards the center of the city, was described by the (Nazi controlled) press as 
the result of the "attacker's desire to hit culturally precious buildings and thus 
transform the most beautiful squares of Vienna into a crater landscape and to 
create in the city as much mayhem as possible."1sa Even though this diction was, 
of course, motivated in part by the hatreds engendered by Nazi propaganda, 
there was no other explanation for the population. In the center of the city, there 
were no factories or railroads, only monumental buildings which were well 
known to the world. "The Americans probably do not fully realize what they 
have done," the paper concluded its article on that day. However, American 
accounts described bombing attacks only in terms of material and numbers; 
the fact that cultural monuments were being hit was not mentioned.185 
Indeed, on that day, whole street blocks were heavily damaged, making 
the faces of many old houses under preservation protection disappear.The 
Viennese mourned the loss of some of their beautiful palaces, like the Harrach, 
which received a full hit, the Pasqualatti House, in which Beethoven had lived, 
and the "Dreimaederl Haus," scene of Schubert's activities. In addition, beautiful 
baroque churches were destroyed, some located in the suburbs which were 
equallv hit. To see artifacts and altar pictures scattered around on the streets 
and throughout the ruins, was a horrible sight. 
As on every other day after air attacks, the citizens attended to their 
clean-up work. "The population copes with the disaster," the same paper 
observed, "as if it is something unavoidable ... a senseless crime, committed to 
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a city which has resisted the Turks and many other menaces." The bombings 
resumed the next day, again on Vienna's "cultural estate," and the press 
reported, "Never have the terror attacks displayed their atrocious senselessness 
more than here."186 
The most infamous of all attacks on Vienna's cultural heritage took place 
on March 12, 1945 when the Vienna State Opera, famed and treasured all over 
the world, took a bad hit.167 The seven-story high ceiling coilapsed, the 
auditorium and stage burned, with flames shooting high into the sky. Word 
spread quickly of the disaster, and citizens hurried to the site in disbelief. 
Karoline Ledinegg had sat close-by in a shelter, after having been denied 
entrance to the Philippi Hof, which lay now in ruins, and hurried back up the 
street when the "all-clear" sign came. "Some people tried to help the fire 
brigade, some were just standing in front of the blazing flames, in shock and 
with tears running down their faces," she said. "I cried too; and I had never even 
been inside the Opera House."1® 
The Viennese opera singer, Ernst Majkut, describes vividly the disaster of 
the stricken opera house in his diary.After actively participating in saving what 
could be saved from the burning house, such as the red and gold plush seats 
from the auditorium, precious costumes, about 250 pieces of sheet music, and 
the grand piano, which he helped push down the front stair case, he went home 
and cried in the arms of his wife. "I have lost ail faith in the beautiful," he wrote in 
his diary, "through this bottomless barbarism."1® 
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Whether it was barbarism, ignorance, indifference, or even indolence, as 
the bombing of the Opera House has been called, or a combination of all of 
that, the precise reason why the Opera House was bom bed cannot be 
pinpointed. One rumor had it that the House had been mistaken for the South 
Railway Station because of its long stretched metallic roof.190 The American 
sources are mum with regard to the destruction of the opera house; neither the 
15th Army-Air Force, throughout its Directive, accounts for the bombing of any- 
other than industrial objects, nor does the Combat Chronoloov mention the 
famous building hit on that particular day.19' "Whatever the reasons were," says 
Karoiine Ledinegg, "it was an inexcusable deed:"192 
As the citizens were inundated more and more not only with the bombing 
but also with the propaganda against its "barbarism," they came to appreciate 
the precautions the city government had taken to protect as many monuments 
and historical treasures as possible.193 Statues and monuments were enclosed 
in cement cases, glass mosaic windows were removed from churches, and 
valuable treasures from museums and castles were transported to secret hiding 
places in the country. One such location was the salt mines of Bad Aussee in 
the Salzkammergut.194 An area of 40,000 square meters, it was efficiently used 
to accommodate precious loads containing church figurines, altars, 
furniture, pictures and whole art collections, even complete libraries and 
archives. Everything was carefully covered with blankets and transported by 
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means of trains, trucks and sleighs. Various caves were chosen because of 
their ideal security as well as climatic conditions (steady temperature and 
humidity.) The accomodation of such delicate artifacts was not an easy 
undertaking. Because of continuous daytime bombing, transport took place 
mostly in the night, and an alert crew had to overcome the obstacles of 
destroyed tracks and railway stations. The storage of sometimes odd-sized 
items into low-height spaces required imagination as well as practical sense. 
But at the end of the war, none of the stored articles had been lost. 
Thanks to their conscientious city government, the Viennese could retrieve all 
their treasures, complete with XVII-century furniture, jewelry collections and the 
legacies of Rubens, Vermeer, Van Dyck, Rembrandt and Velasquez, as well as 
treasures saved from other countries, (some confiscated from Italy by retreating 
German troops) such as the artifacts of Monte Cassino, and the Naples 
Museum's "The Blind," by Peter Brueghel. 
The extraordinary dimensions of the Austrian treasure-saving operation 
in the face of American bombing are truly mind-boggling:195 All in all, eighty 
wagons of art treasures with a value of $ 3-1/2 billion (1946) were put in 
storage; and what was more it was all saved despite the Nazis' wish in the last 
minute to blow everything up in the wake of their downfall. Even though the 
American bombardment destroyed countless treasures in the city of Vienna 
itself, it could not touch the Austrian emperor's crown, Van Eyck's Ghent altar 
painting and the Mona Lisa. 196 
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If the Viennese appeared to fret too much over their art treasures, 
palaces and Opera House, it must be oointed out that they were just as 
outraged over the bombing of kindergartens, hospitals and churches. Towards 
the last months of the war, when Vienna was subjected to almost daily bombing 
attacks, the second district, adjacent to the inner city (the first district) took heavy 
blows. They resulted, in addition to an almost total wipe-out of whole blocks, in 
the damaging of the Kindergarten on Obere Augartenstrasse and the oldest 
hospital, not only of the district but the whole city, as well as the historic St. 
Leopold Church.197 
The helpless, bewildered children of the stricken Augartenstrasse 
Kindergarten were not any better off than patients in hospitals who, already 
bogged down with adversities had to be collected in beds, gurneys and 
wheelchairs to be taken down to the basement, where intravenous devices, 
heart monitors and operation room equipment had to be accommodated. The 
downed bomber pilot Parker, himself recuperating in the Vienna Robert Koch 
Hospital and empathizing with his fellow patients --"five stories of bed-ridden 
humanity,"--1® gave an account of such an attack: 
Sixty-nine bombs landed in the hospital complex, killing many people, 
including eleven Catholic sisters who were nurses. . . Our hospital was 
located about one quarter mile from the Suedbahnhof rail yard. . . One 
500 pounder hit our five story building with the debris completely 
blocking the one exit from the air raid cellar, trapping two hundred people 
for hours until they could dig us out.1® 
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If the bombardiers mistook the Opera House's roof for that of a railway 
station, they couldn't claim the same mistake here. Hospitals had a large cross 
painted on their roofs, complying with rules of the Geneva Convention. "Birth 
clinic as bomb target," was the caption of a picture appearing in the 
newspaper,333 showing the complete destruction of what was once a hospital. 
And it went on to say, "The bombs of the American air gangsters have hit a 
birth clinic. The ruins, together with all the other destroyed hospitals and 
schools, cultural premises and churches, serve as an accusation for the 
enemy's bomb terror." Even if the phrasing can be attributed to the typical 
rhetoric of Nazi propaganda, the photograph of the destruction of the hospital 
was realistic enough to play on the resentment of the Viennese population. 
There is no evidence that cultural and medical institutions were hit out of 
barbarism or revenge,-- but instead, most Viennese assumed that many of 
these targets were hit by mistake.201 While the bombers aimed at armament 
factories, oil refineries and railroad tracks, some bombs missed their targets 
and fell on housing areas, "whole bomb-carpets of it."22 Reasons for this were 
either navigational errors, technical malfunctions, weather conditions, 
insufficient information, and/or a combination of some of these factors. When 
"Lone Wolves" bomber pilots followed their standing orders, requiring them to 
return to base when certain visual conditions were encountered, they often 
dropped their load indiscriminately before going home, or if a target could not 
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be approached, bombs were dropped because the crew did not want to take the 
load back to the base.203 
"They didn't always know what they were hitting " said Larry Babits,2" 
reading from his 15th AAF pilot father's entrances into a war journal which 
described day-to-day missions. "Often, in Austria," he said, "weather conditions 
were such that targets were not always visible." And, says Karl Pospischii, 
"Particularly towards the end of the war, it didn't seem to matter much anymore, 
one way or the other.205 
The weather in Austria was known to be unstable, particularly over the 
Alps. On the infamous day that the Opera was hit, however, conditions were 
described as "good weather."206 
The statistics about the damage to cultural buildings207 show that in 
1944/1945, all concert halls and theaters, as well as libraries and book stores, 
museums, exhibition hails and art institutes, were damaged. In addition, of 421 
schoolhouses 67 were totaly destroyed, and 119 heavily and 235 slightly 
damaged. Of 220 cinemas, only 120 could be used again after the war; of 400 
city gyms, only 75 survived, as did 50 of the 100 athletic fields; of 60 public 
baths 23 were heavily, 20 slightly damaged. 
In their daily struggle of survival citizens learned to observe duties 
which gave them aid and sometimes comfort. In many instances they had no 
choice but to depend on their government. They also knew when to depend on 
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each other and use their own initiatives, thus overcoming many obstacles that in 
their pragmatism they recognized as inherent. They could understand war, but 
the destruction of cultural monuments distressed them particularly because 
they could not understand the reasons for it. Determination to overcome 
obstacles helped many citizens in the end to survive. 
Chapter 5: NUTRITION AND HEALTH 
it is of utmost importance that every person in Germany should realize 
that . . . Germany is a defeated nation. I do not want them to starve to 
death, but . . . The Fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and 
individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to 
start any new war. . .208 
While the rationing of food is a common war measure as an early means 
to prevent famine, the start of regular bombing of Vienna brought a significant 
urgency to the government's programs. 
The waning military successes of the Axis and the renewed bombing of 
German cities had contributed to Hitler's declaration of a total war effort. This 
new phase had an impact also on the question of nutrition and other health 
matters. In Vienna, due to the continuous interruption of the transportation 
network, the supply and distribution of goods became more and more difficult. 
As the American bombing put out of action more and more roadways, railway 
tracks and vehicles, all rationing was severely affected. 
The rationing system for food supplies.209 
The rationing program went into effect for the whole Reich at the 
beginning of the war, September 1,1939; the food-loving Viennese population 
deemed it inadequate almost from the beginning.210 After only two months into 
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the war, shortages of rationed amounts required citizens to stand in long lines in 
front of grocery stores. On October 13,1939, housewives lining up in front of a 
fish store on the Mariahilferstrasse were hauled away in police cars, under 
protest, for violating a law against standing in line. Nazi officials had only 
recently created this law in an attempt to deny unfavorable conditions. 
According to a report by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD)211 from November 6, 
1939, there was a shortage of fruits and vegetables causing Viennese citizens 
to suspect that the goods were distributed to the German homeland only. And 
again, in December, 1939, housewives complained that the six supplementary 
eggs that were authorized for Christmas were withheld from the previous 
week's regular ration. 
These initial problems were only an indication of what was still to come 
once the bombing started. Obviously, the American bombing phase made it 
more acute because of the vulnerability of industries and the transportation 
system. How much the prolonged and successful Allied bombing affected the 
nutrition of the population as a whole is shown by a statement of Goebbels, of 
March 1, 1945: 
"We are already forced to make extraordinarily severe reductions 
in the food rations and shall soon be compelled to make even 
more. . . . We shall very soon be forced to reduce by 35-50 % the 
ration of the most important items, fat and bread.?12 
Though the Nazis' extensive rationing system barely met the 
population's needs, in the end it justified itself as chaos and famine were 
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avoided. The bureaucratic organization and the ingrained discipline of the 
population, once again, were the means which helped the population survive. 
Operation213 
The highest authority in charge of food supply was the Reichsrninisterium 
fuer Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft (Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture) 
and the Reichsnaehrstand (Reich Food Estate,) the former having control over 
policy and administration and the latter over executing agrarian policy. During 
the war the Reichsnaehrstand operated under the supervision of the Ministry 
which in turn was subordinated to the Ministerial Council for the defense of the 
Reich. These two organizations were in charge of enforcing regulations on 
production, sales and distribution of agricultural products, including price 
controls. 
The Food Estate whose director was also the Minister of Food and 
Agriculture, was subdivided into provincial, district and local farmers 
associations; the latter were in charge of deliveries of agricultural produce from 
the peasants. Also under the Food Estate were Central Marketing Associations 
at the national level, the purpose of which was to regulate and tax the 
movement of agricultural goods. There were Central Marketing Associations for 
grain and fodder, milk and fats, eggs, livestock, potatoes, sugar, garden 
products, vineyard products, fish, and the brewery and confectionary industries. 
The Associations dealt in domestic trade only. Imported food was controlled by 
Reich offices which took care of tariffs, storage and marketing . 
Germany, including Austria, provided 83 percent of its food needs at the 
beginning of the war. The average citizen consumed 2200-2400 calories per 
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day, according to the State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Food & Agriculture, 
but the production possibilities had reached their limit and any decrease had 
a noticeable effect on the nutritional status of the population. Large industrial 
cities depend on supplies from rural areas and a good transportation system. 
Therefore, the bombing of rail- and waterways and oth.r transportation facilities 
had important negative consequences. Aerial bombing made the operation of 
food processing industries more difficult. The only measures that could be taken 
were the rerouting of loads to other, still operational facilities and the 
construction of new plants. 
Storage 
The air war also damaged storage facilities, another important link in the 
chain of food supply. Reserve food stocks and certain foods in short supply were 
destroyed as was the necessary power for refrigeration. An incident in Germany 
provides an illustration:^ the "Linde Kuehlhaus" refrigerated plant of Munich 
was hit by an incendiary bomb which destroyed approximately 2,000,000 eggs, 
400,000 kg of butter and 100,000 kg of meat. To counteract occurrences like 
this, the Ministry of Food ordered greater decentralization of facilities, but the 
proper functioning of facilities was still very dependent on transportation and on 
power supply. Official American assessment later concluded that the damage 
to the bombarded citizens' food supply and distribution system, was 
"extensive, but not alone sufficient to upset the food economy structure."^5 
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Distribution216 
A major task of the Ministry of Food was to direct the distribution of food 
staples (flour, sugar, fat, etc.) uniformly and to ensure an adequate food supply 
to each consumer, allowing the rationing system to provide allowances of the 
principal foods at intervals of four weeks. Each consumer received rationing 
cards with designated stubs which were given to the grocer in return for the 
portions. 
The destruction of railroads, bridges and terminal facilities, was the 
biggest single factor in the disruption of the food distribution and prompted a 
shift from water- and railways to road transportation, but the size of loads was of 
course cut down. In 1942, at Goebbels' order, an Interrninisterial Air War 
Damage Committee (Interministerieller Luftkriegsschaecenausschuss, or LKA) 
was formed to consolidate calls by cities for assistance after air raids. The LKA 
was to make available emergency food supplies for communal feeding in the 
case of a city's inability to take care of its citizens. An elaborate chain of 
command was to come into operation: the food ministry representative on the 
committee advised the Central Marketing Association to give orders to the 
appropriate Provincial Marketing association. The liason official in the Ministry 
of Food then asked the rail and transportation authorities for the necessary 
shipment of food to bombed cities. Similarly, the NSV transferred extra food 
supplies to Municipal Food Offices after an air attack and would try to restore the 
normal food supply within three days after the raid. But by February, 1945, the 
transport situation had become so severe that the Ministry could only send food 
to a bombed city from the surrounding province. 
'"The Effects of Slrategic Bombing, po 272-4. 
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The Ministry operated the Food Rationing System by basing its 
calculations on a lood balance sheet from month to month.217 For the purpose of 
establishing needs the civilian population was divided into several consumer 
groups, according to age and occupation. But allowances were decreased as 
the war went on and towards the end hit starvation levels. Children, nursing and 
pregnant women got extra rations, on the basis of "standards laid down by the 
national health organization."218 The rations were based on general availability 
and on national dietary habits rather than on nutritional values. While calories, 
protein and fat content were periodically calculated, mineral and vitamin 
contents were never considered. 
Continuing diminuation of the available food resulted in gradual 
reduction of rations until in November 1944, when reductions reached a 
critical stage, particularly for the "normal consumer" group. By the beginning of 
1945, with the even higher frequency of bombing, the basic principles of 
rationing had to be abandoned altogether and a reduced version of the ration 
cards was introduced in April of that year. At the end of the war the average 
Austrian citizen consumed only 1200 calories per day.219 
In Vienna, the NSV was an important organization in the distribution of 
food to bombed-out citizens. Shortly after an air attack, members of this 
organization would distribute "Eintopf," a single dish meal, bread and hot 
substitute coffee at central locations, or directly at the bombing location. As the 
surviving population spent an increasing number of hours in air raid bunkers, 
especially during the last few months of the war, they found it necessary to 
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provide for tneir own makeshift kitchen facilities. In the final phase of the war, 
during the siege of Vienna, when the population spent almost two consecutive 
weeks in shelters, people had to use their own initiatives to procure and 
process food. Tenants brought their petroleum burners or even started small 
wood fires on the floor of the basement; and by pooling together food 
ingredients they could still come up with, they continued to cook "community 
meals ".2aa 
Quality of the national diet2*1 
A ration was determined by weight rather than nutritional value, but there 
was a list in the Ministry citing reduced human nutritional requirements for 
calories, protein, fat and carbohydrates, which could be approximated under 
war conditions. According to the American survey, no firm conclusion can be 
drawn22 on the total effect of strategic bombing concerning food supplies in an 
enemy country. The bombing of food processing and storage locations, as well 
as transportation, certainly curtailed the German and Austrian people's diet 
even though it cannot be stated in exact terms to what extent the destruction of 
these particular targets contributed to the final defeat of the enemy. What can be 
definitely established is that the bombing contributed to the shortage of food. 
Supplements223 
There also existed an elaborate list of special supplements which 
consisted of a few addtional foods and vitamin concentrates for sick citizens or 
pregnant women. For example, pregnant and nursing women could receive a 
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half a liter of milk (about a pint) per day, plus 125 grams (about 4oz) of butter per 
week. Interestingly, the Reich Midwife Association was allowed by the Ministry 
of Food to distribute 20 grams (about 3/4 oz) of roasted coffee for each woman 
in labor, "as a stimulant."224 Another supplement program was the "Vitamin 
Aktion" of the Ministry of the Interior, which issued Viamin C in the form of lemon 
flavored sugar tablets containing 50mg, later in 1943, 30mg, of synthetic 
ascorbic acid, to school children for 3 consecutive months. Interestingly, the 
importance of vitamins was considered greatly overrrated and potatoes were 
seen as sufficient sources of vitamin C. General vegetables were to provide 
vitamin A. Vitamins, by the way, were never rationed. 
The system of rationing cards was designed in such a way that the 
average citizen was expected to be adequately nourished. But it was no secret 
in Vienna that just about everyone tried with more or less success to augment 
his rations through other sources; in addition, the government provided 
supplementary programs, such as 
"Erntelandaktion" -- harvest garden program 
Participants of this state-run program planted vegetables and potatoes 
on small garden plots which the city provided --all in all, 10 million square 
meters. From one square meter one could harvest about two kilos of 
vegetables or potatoes. 
Public vegetable gardens 
The city of Vienna even planted vegetable gardens in some public parks 
which were regularly tended to by city employees. One of the better known 
ones was on the Heldenplatz, a very large square, which displayed rows and 
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rows of potato plants. It was also the square from which Hitler, a few years 
earlier, had entered the Hofburg's Office of the Chancellor.226 
"Lebensmittelzusatzkarten" -Grocery supplement tickets 
All during the war and the bombing period, about 900,000 "Zusatzkarten" 
were used in addition to the regular ones, which provided, except for the last 
phase of the war, extra calories for certain groups of the population: 
GROUPS OF THE POPULATION EXTRA CALORIES 
"Heavy" Laborers  1250 
Laborers  650 
"Regular" employees  200 
Pregnant and nursing mothers  1250 
Sick (under doctors' care)  1250 
Rations for special assignment workers 
People with special assignments such as in the "Ernteeinsatz" -harvest 
assignment-- received rations according to a special order from the Reich 
Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture, who termed the harvest assignment as 
"very important for the securement of nutrition for the German nation," and 
"necessary for the success of the'battle for nutrition' and for guaranteeing 
nutrition for the front as well as home."226 
"There were still many people who, for various reasons, fell through the 
cracks," says Karoline Ledinegg. "Older people, for example, couldn't be as 
enterprising in their quest of augmenting allocated food rations; many babies 
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and small children lacked special nutrients and therefore suffered from 
malnutrition; one from our apartment house even died."227 
Supplies of food decreased as the war and the bombing dragged on. 
According to a Nazi official,25 a secret press conference was held in January 
1945, in which a spokesman for the NS Farmer Association spoke about the 
acute problem of food supply. There existed a plan to mobilize all reserves and 
even slaughter all stock. Wheat could not be transported anymore because of 
total lack of fuel. "With regard to nutrition," the official reported, "the war is 
already lost." On March 1, 1945, Goebbels wote in his diary: 
. . . [the rations] will fall below the tolerabie minimum subsistence 
level. In some cases reductions must be made straight away, in 
others we can allow ourselves until 9 April. One can imagine what 
the effect on the public will be. Even if we reconquer our eastern 
territories we shall not avoid severe shortages; hunger will be 
added to all our people's miseries.But, as we know, in this struggle 
there is nothing except to try to hold out bravely.23 
Interestingly, according to Karoline Ledinegg,230 there were two food 
items that were never rationed; they were cabbages and parsnips. 
Clothing 
Issue cards231 
Obtaining enough clothing was as difficult as getting enough food. 
Clothing was obtained legitimately only with a "Bezugschem" --"issue card," 
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resembling the ration card for groceries. It was just as scarce, as its supply 
depended on bomb-beleaguered transportation and, furthermore, only war- 
related items were allowed to be produced. It was not unusual for a desperate- 
citizen to resort to petition a government official for extra help. For example, in 
January 1943, a Dr. Reinhart from the Main Economics Office, agreed to help a 
Heinrich Paletz to acquire a suit. 
For special situations, a "Zusatzkleiderkarte" --"auxiliary clothes ticket" 
and/or a "Zusatzschuhkarte" --"auxiliary shoe ticket" could be issued with which 
a citizen could buy work clothes and a good pair of shoes, as was required in 
the Harvest Assignment.22 
Clothes collections233 
The civilian population was not alone in facing a lack of clothing, the 
armed forces suffered from shortages also. To help, the population was 
encouraged to collect and donate used textiles in all forms. As everything else 
in the Reich, the big propaganda machine promoted this activity and coined the 
catch word "Volksopfer" --"national sacrifice." Towards the end of 1944, more 
than 100,000 tons of raw material for clothing was needed for uniforms for the 
Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm, but also for the requirements of victims of the air 
raids, and for baby and infant clothing." 
Despite the citizens' own need, the collection of yarn, underwear and 
clothing in 1944 resulted in 36,000 tons. According to a Party letter from 
December 27, 1944, a much larger donation was now needed. A new call went 
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out for old spinning material, used underwear, and clothing and uniforms of all 
kinds. From the Fuehrer Fleadquarters, Martin Bormann, head of the Volkssturm, 
ordered on behalf of the Fuehrer the preparation and carrying out of the 
donation, to take place during a three-week period in January 1945, by officials 
of the NSDAP. He emphasized that the carrying out of the donation was of '"war- 
decisive" importance and was expected by the Fuehrer to be 'mastered' by the 
party along with everything else." 
Sport 
Bormann had orders from the Fuehrer to pursue another "health matter" 
throughout the Reich: sport. On March 9, 1943, in a special order to Nazi 
officials, Borman wrote: 
Concerning sporting events during the war: physical exercise is 
essential for the war and is to be enforced vigorously. . . Sporting events 
are to be organized in the form of competitions, but only regionally, not 
nationally or internationally. Signed, Martin Borman.23" 
Not too many adults were interested in sport by the time bombing began. 
"After the bombing had already started," Karoline Ledinegg remembers, " my 
boss wanted to set up a track and field team consisting of meter-reader- 
women, but we protested, reminding him that racing to the shelters and hunting 
down streetcars was enough to keep us fit."26 
For the youth in schools and Nazi Youth organizations, sport was a 
major part of their activities. It enforced the illusion that despite the bombing, life 
was "normal." 
"
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Disposal of the dead236 
A peculiar health problem, heavily influenced by tho bombinc, 
pariicuiariy towards the end of the war, was the disposal of the dead. Because 
of inadequate transportation facilities, corpses were stored in neighborhood 
churches, coffee houses and movie theaters, where they were then picked up 
by a newly adapted contraption, the "casket street car."257 
Passenger seats were replaced with compartments which looked like 
large, open safety deposit boxes, and after the pick-up at the collection points, 
the caskets or -- following the complete destruction of Vienna's casket factory in 
the bombing attack of February 13, 1945-- the mere bodies, wrapped in paper 
or cardboard, could then be neatly filed into them. With its macabre load, -- 
carrying sometimes up to 60 corpses,--the vehicle was sent on its route in the 
pitch-black night. Since black-out times were in effect, and few ventured out 
voluntarily at this time, very few citizens ever saw the casket streetcar; it was not 
a feature conducive to the uplift of spirit the Nazi propaganda so urgently 
demanded. 
When the largest city cemetery, the Zentralfriedhof in the outer district of 
Simmering, was hit, in March 1945, it only highlighted the difficulties of the 
city's burial department. This came at a time when funeral activities were at a 
height and transportation had been already badly interrupted. Many bodies 
could only be buried in mass graves. To keep this from happening to their loved 
ones, some citizens buried them in backyards and public parks. The Viennese 
actor, director and producer of Metropolitan Opera productions, Otto Schenk, 
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remembers how he, then a young boy, together with his mother, buried his 
grandmother in the Volksgarten, a park that is now abundant with beautiful 
roses.238 
Because corpses could not be accommodated anymore by the 
government they were openly piled up inside and outside the cemetery church. 
During the siege of Vienna, there were 5000 dead bodies lying around.230 
During these last months of the war, some citizens tried to help themselves by 
acquiring a casket on the black market, building one themselves, tying the 
corpse to a wooden board and even wrapping it in paper. Throwing a shovel 
across their shoulder, they trecked to the cemetery and dug a grave themselves 
so that their relative or friend did not have to be buried in a mass grave. 
Because of the air raids, they often couldn't make it on time to the burial if one 
did take place. In that case, all that was left to do for them was take the little 
piece of paper that was handed to them, describing the row and number of the 
grave. 
"
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CHAPTER 6: BOMBARDMENT FROM WITHIN: THE PROPAGANDA 
All compatriots form a "community of fate"-- who have to cling to 
each other in life and death ... If everybody does the right thing, 
the enemy will not reach its goal which is to bring disorder to the 
economy and confusion to the population. A nation which carries 
within it an iron will for self preservation, will resist successfully the 
dangers from the air. Heil to the Fuehrer! Heil to Germany! Signed: 
Goering.240 
The phrase of the "community of fate" was one of several slogans such 
as the catchy "soldier of the home-front," the "iron will," and speeches about 
Fatherland and fate, that served as links in a chain of powerful phrases 
intended to motivate the population to resist the enemy^ Thus, trying to survive 
in the midst of all the problems brought on by the bombing, the population 
found itself with yet another head of the hydra to chop off. It could be called the 
bombardment from within; it was the Nazi propaganda machine. 
As it rapid-fired into the citizen's homes and public places, it used as its 
ammunition spoken and written communication in radio broadcasts, the Reich- 
run press, and public address systems in public places. Propaganda also 
used fear and terror, and thus pervaded all stations of human life, invading 
even innermost feelings. 
When the air war in Vienna began, the propaganda machine reacted 
particularly sharply and began with renewed urgency to deal with the new 
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situation.The goal was to motivate the citizens to overcome the conditions 
created by the Allied bombing, and thus, prevent the break-down of morale, 
and turn psychologically against the enemy, which would strengthen 
support for the war effort and contribute to the ultimate victory. 
By 1944, the Viennese population's reaction to Nazi propaganda was 
rather negative.^ After veiled reports of Nazi military defeats, including 
knowledge of the rising death toll of soldiers and civilians, the majority of the 
population began to realize the probability of defeat. Two important myths of 
the Viennese had been shattered: first, the belief in the technical superiority of 
German war material, and secondly, the hope for a quick victory. It was also 
apparent by now, that "Austro-Fascism" had lost its original appeal. As an 
Austrian politician pointed out later:*3 "Austrian Fascism has always embraced 
only a small minority of the Austrian population. It would have never been able 
to grab political power based on the democratic constitution and by lawful 
means. That's why it violated the constitution and used violence."244 While this 
last statement can be regarded as hypothetical, the world war to fight the Nazi 
system with all its ramifications was more apt to turn the Austrian citizens 
against fascism. 
An SD-report315 of March 10,1944, at a time when only the sporadic 
beginnings of the bombing of Vienna had taken place, recorded a pessimistic 
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mood: "The bombing attacks contributed to the war weariness and fatalistic, 
destructive tendencies of citizens in Vienna's workers districts . . . The belief in 
a final victory is present in only a very few. 
The population was more concerned by then with the bombing from 
above rather than the barrage from within and so mostly ignored the 
propaganda. Instead, people displayed the stoic cooperation of disillusioned 
and cautious pragmatists, as they went about their day-to-day struggle for 
survival. "At that point of the war," Karoline Ledinegg says,*7 "we were so used 
to this kind of 'brainwashing,' the endless repetition of all these slogans 
seemed merely rhetoric. They were considered empty phrases and could only 
inspire real believers." 
Regardless of the indifference of the population, the Party members were 
relentlessly drilled to influence the population "positively:"^ In a special order 
for the purpose of educating the leadership, titled "Discussion evenings of the 
NSDAR" and signed by Martin Bormann, the Nazi members were advised: 
It is necessary for the NSDAP to spark continuously the fierce 
determination and cooperation of the nation . . . The Party has to 
be fanatic and enthusiastic, instinctively and politically smart, and 
has to influence through [the members ] personal actions even the 
small things and events of every-day life. 
In these sessions, party members were encouraged to counteract, —"in 
the hours of emotional and nen/ous stress"— every utterance of weakness, of 
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doubt or distrust, with expression of faithful trust in the leadership. There was 
an interesting addendum: 
It is not important whether each party member present who has 
anything to say, gets to speak; important for the outcome of this 
evening is the fiery diction of the speaker as well as the common 
belief in the requirements of the total war. 
Propaganda certainly reverberated in the work place. Karoline Ledinegg 
reports that one of her bosses, a proclaimed Nazi, always used with conviction 
a multitude of slogans, such as i2"9 
"The front fights and wins, the homeland works and sacrifices!" 
"Whoever does not follow the air protection rules is a national parasite." 
"The cooperation of the woman in air protection is a national duty." 
"He reminded us every day," says Karoline Ledinegg, "what women 
were supposed to do, for example, to collect scrap metal for making a birthday 
gift to the Fuehrer; but my collegues and I mostly ignored him; we just nodded 
pleasantly and went about our business. But, generally, and in all public 
situations, people didn't dispute phrases like these; they knew better than that." 
Still, it seems that this kind of propaganda indeed contributed to the 
uplifting of the bomb-weary citizens' spirit. It gave them a certain feeling of 
security, which often comes with repetition, despite the sometimes grim Nazi 
diction, like "sacrifice," "duty," and "parasite." But there were people who had 
different experiences with propaganda; open non-conformity or rejection of 
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slogans could result in Nazi persecution, even though sometimes nothing 
happened. "I never participated in any of the campaigns, Karoline Ledinegg 
says, " and I was never questioned about it." 
But unfortunately, there were "more pernicious ways in which an ever 
increasing number of people were tortured or executed without trial or sentence 
for no worse crime than unorthodox opinions."235 Der Oesterreichische 
Freiheitskaempfer reported that after the air attacks in Vienna-Favoriten,21 
which was according to SD-reports a particular trouble spot, machine guns 
were positioned against the population. "In spite of it, no actions of resistance 
against the 'brown pest' and its war were activated," the report states, " it was 
because of the paralyzing fear of Nazi terror. The citizens also feared "small 
terror," the type which punished with "small" penalties, such as the curtailing of 
necessities provided by the government, and punitive assignments."22 
When Goebbels tried to "convince the mass of German people that their 
only hope of saving the Fatherland and themselves lay in giving unconditional 
obedience to the Fuehrer and unconditional resistance to their enemies," it only 
intensified their wish to survive on their own means. The fear of retaliation for 
nonconformity was perhaps the primary reason why there was never any open 
resistance to the Nazi regime. But there were other factors. Under the 
desperate straits of the bombardment, as destruction multiplied, people 
became more dependent than ever on the government for their very essentials. 
So, instead of rising in revolt against the authorities, as the Allies had at one 
time hoped, the citizens found themselves bound to support a regime which, 
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after all, preserved order and continued to supply them with food, clothing and 
other necessities. How could they sabotage the war effort without doing the 
same to their very own existence?253 Furthermore, amidst the hardships and 
severe conditions of the bombing, they feit strongly that any internal revolution 
at this stage would only bring chaos. 
Finally it may be asked, how could people sabotage any kind of war 
effort that could be of utmost importance to the survival of their own flesh and 
blood (husbands and sons) fighting in the field and at the front? During the 
bombing period, civilian morale was a question of great concern, not only to 
Nazi propagandists, but also to American bombing strategists. Each side 
attempted to manipulate it in its favor, in opposite directions. While Nazi 
propaganda wanted to win the war by sustaining the people's morale, 
American bombing strategists put their faith into bombing as a way of "busting" 
morale. 
Some American strategists hoped that the bombing would make the 
German population feel so miserable, they would rebel against their 
government and overthrow it. They argued that . . if coordinated with major 
military defeats or mounting military losses, massive bombing might destroy 
German morale. If the Germans could be brought to realize that total victory 
would forever elude them and that they themselves would now begin to suffer, 
the Nazi regime could crumble from within ... a sudden disintegration of the 
enemy always remained a distinct possibility . . . "S6 However, military planners 
considered it even possible at one time in 1943 that to the contrary "bombing 
"
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might actually strengthen the civilian fighting spirit. And even if civilian moraie 
would be destroyed, it would not help to get rid of Nazi control."Z6 
One post-war analysis supported that prediction: "Air attacks only 
hardened the Germans' will to resist: German domestic morale did not crack 
and fighting continued longer than thought possible, " and: "Nazi and Allied 
victories and defeats came about through conventional -- military means rather 
than through political warfare."257 The captured American pilot Claude Parker, 
describing "the stark terror created by the 'cuckoo'" and how he couldn't help 
"seeing with his own eyes the utter confusion, the chaos, the disruption in the 
lives of people living in Vienna . . ."25B corroborates this conclusion, maintaining 
that despite the destructiveness and the attempt to use the bombings as the 
means to undermine the spirit of the population, the morale of the people was 
never broken. 
Nazi propagandists, in the meantime, worked hard to brainwash the 
population and keep their spirits up by broadcasting special radio reports with 
emphasis on speeches of the Fuehrer, as well as of the Minister of Propaganda 
and other Nazi officers. Regular reports from the front painted conditions in a 
much better light than was warranted, and dripped of optimism and grandiose 
illusions, as well as derision of the enemy. For years after the war was over, 
Franz Liszt's "Les Preludes," which the Nazis had chosen as the musical theme 
for broadcasting front reports, evoked mixed emotions among the people. 
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There were also newspapers, the public speeches in parks and squares, even 
peculiar reflection hours ("Feierstunden"):2* 
A national-socialist 'Feierstunde' in the Burghof ended our Reichs 
meeting. Recitation, choir singing and music reflected not only the 
seriousness of our times but also the confidence one could read in the 
eyes of each of the young Fahnenjunkers, [flag boy] who will soon again 
stand before the enemy, with greater and more responsible functions. At 
the peak of the celebration hour, three "Ritterkreuz"-bearers of the army 
read messages of great army leaders to the youth of Grossdeutschland, 
conveying to them not only gratefulness, but also encouragement for 
renewed persistence. 
Propaganda posters demonstrated particularly well "the art of Nazi 
manipulation."260 Making reference to the American "enemy" bombardment, they 
were intended to encourage the suffering population to carry on. The posters 
were produced by the Nazi regime in cooperation with the high command of the 
Wehrmacht. "Life goes on and work goes on," said one, "despite the bombing 
terror;" another shewed the picture of destroyed streetcar tracks with the 
caption: "Streetcars will operate here again tomorrow!" A third showed a 
toddler in front of a destroyed apartment house, tended to by an agent of the 
NSV, proclaiming: "Bombed out alright, but fed nevertheless." 
The propaganda theme of the "citizen as an important war effort 
contributor" had sometimes almost comical results. "The Vienna Symphony in 
the war effort,"a6'' was the dramatic headline with which the press announced 
the Vienna Symphony's closure. The revered musicians were praised for 
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having exchanged their musical instruments for weapons and for offering 
themselves for the war effort. 
Propaganda also reached into the mundane as well as the utterly private 
affairs of the citizens, in order to keep them focused on the war goals as well as 
the party ideals. What better way was there than to play on the emotions of 
people when they were the most vulnerable? Christmas celebrations in military 
hospitals were given special attention; after all, recovered soldiers were still 
needed at the front. Martin Borman ordered these celebrations to observe 
strict rules, and guidelines on the involvement of the party were to be obtained 
from the Main Culture Office of the Reichspropaganda Headquarters.22 The only 
things that were not regulated were the Christmas cookies; they were allowed 
to be baked, with no particular specification, in the hospital kitchen. 
Invading people's lives, Nazi government regulations reached as far as 
death. A peculiar order addressed even wreath arrangements and eulogies tor 
deceased officials:253 
(1) A wreath with ribbon was to be provided by public money. 
(2) A band was to be affixed with a black swastika on white background. 
(3) The band was to be placed "in an efficient manner" to the lower parts 
of the red ribbon, so that there would be room for a dedication. 
(4) The dedication was to be written uniformly in silver script. 
(5) The cost had to be "moderate," not to exceed 20 Reichsmark in the 
months of May to October, and 30 Reichsmark from November to April. 
As the regime became more aware of the impatience, disillusionment 
and ever growing disgust of the population, it attempted to direct hatred 
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towards the air attacks of the Americans, calling them in ine press "air attack 
gangsters" and "bomb terrorists" who used churches as their "military targets."264 
Common sense told the Viennese citizens that it was actually the Nazi regime 
that had gotten them not only into the war, but also by its refusal to surrender, 
into the air war. Rather than hate the Americans, despite all the mayhem, the 
population resigned themselves to the fact that this bombing might actually 
help to get rid of the regime. 
Nazi propaganda motivated the non-believers to focus on the most 
important issue of all which was to remain alive; eventually this terrible war 
was going to be over. As the war progressed, particularly as the bombardment 
became a daily ordeal, the citizens relied more and more on their own 
spirituality; the distaste for the Nazi regime seemed to boost iheir own skills of 
resources and brought out their resilience and hardiness. 
Kiffine Wiener Krieqszertung. November 17,1944, December 6,1944, October 19,1944. 
CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE 
The morale of the German people, both at home and at the front, is 
sinking ever lower . . . The people thinks [sic] that it is facing a 
perfectly hopeless situation in this war . . . The people will 
continue to do their duty and the front-line soldier will defend 
himself as far as he has a possibility of doing so. These 
possibilities are becoming increasingly limited however, primarily 
owing to the enemy's air superiority. The air terror which rages 
uninterruptedly over German home territory makes people 
thoroughly despondent. One feels so impotent against it that no 
one can now see a way out of the dilemma.265 
With the final siege of Vienna in April 1945, the city came closest to 
chaos. This condition, the aim of the Allied air war, came about only in the final 
hours, when Soviet troops approached Austria from the East. 
On Good Friday, March 30th, 1945, the distant booming of guns could 
already be heard, as Soviet troops under Marshall Tolbukhin had come close 
to the Austrian-Hungarian borders The next day, railroad yards were 
bombarded as well as all Danube bridges and important intersections. The 
aerial bombings, which were still continuing, --the last attack occurred on April 
3, 1945- caused extensive fires in so many places that the fire brigades could 
not be in all locastions at the same time anymore. The Viennese population 
moved into cellars and began a stint of ten days of underground living. As the 
Soviets entered Vienna, on April 6, 1945, fiercely fighting remnants of Nazi 
forces in the streets, all bureaucratic and commercial life on the "outside" had 
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completely ceased. Martial law was established. The Gauleiter of Vienna, 
Baldur von Schirach, now also Defense Commissioner, quickly declared the 
city a fortress and called up the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth for a last 
defense. Fourteen- and fifteen-year old boys were told to dig foxholes and 
defend themselves with panzerfausts.257 He himself finally fled the city. His wife 
describes the Schirach family's exit in her later memoirs: "Driving away, ! looked 
back like Lot's wife. All I saw was burnt homes, miserable streets; and it was 
snowing."26s 
On April 7, 1945, Goebbels' entry in his diary, reads: "In the East Vienna 
is the critical point. The enemy has reached the city area on the south-west. . . 
The south-eastern section of Vienna is already largely in his hands."269 
Had the American Air Force achieved its stated goals? Militarily, a 
number of goals were met: 
the destruction of Vienna as a railroad and transportation center, 
the destruction of Austrian oil facilities and industries, 
the final prostration of the southeast post of the German Reich. 
However, the psychological part, that of breaking the morale of the 
people was not achieved. All sources have maintained that "German domestic 
morale did not crack."270 
Even as Vienna lay finally prostrate on the ground, -the estimated 
amount of debris was 850,000 cubic meters, resulting from the destruction of 
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close to 4,000 buildings—27 ths moral© of th© psopl©, though low at times, was 
never broken. Their sense of respect for authority, which led them to accept a 
certain regimentation in order to increase their chances of survival, together 
with a combination of common sense, stubbornness and resilience, had 
helped them to survive. 
By early April, the Strategic Air Command had begun to run out of 
suitable targets in Germany.272 Western German ports, especially Hamburg, and 
their surrounding industries had received terrific and repeated poundings. 
Berlin had taken an almost daily pounding, and throughout the whole Reich the 
Air Force had blasted industries, transportation, airfields, and port facilities 
along the Baltic. The German Air Force was no longer a menace, much of 
Germany had ceased to be enemy territory, and the need for further destruction 
had finally passed. On April 16, 1945, General Spaatz terminated the strategic 
air war against Germany. 
It should not surprise anybody that the American Air Force military 
command felt, that they had done a good job and considered their mission 
accomplished; the Allied bombing, in their assessment, was a success. And it 
was, of course, from a military viewpoint, expressed in the United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey which came to this conclusion about the final 
chapter of the war: 
Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe. Hindsight 
inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or 
better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive ... Its power 
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and superiority made possible the success of the invasion. It brought 
the economy which sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual 
collapse, although the full effects of this collapse had not reached the 
enemy's front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces. It 
brought home to the German people the full impact of modern war 
with all its horror and suffering. Its imprint on the German nation will 
be lasting.273 
Even though this statement, by its nature, was meant to sound forceful 
and convincing, a few thoughts about its accuracy are in order. Whether the 
employed air power was decisive or not may be subject to various strategists 
and experts' opinions; it can be argued, however, that to the contrary, "air 
attacks only hardened the Germans' will to resist:274 
The final sentences of the Strategic Bombing Survey's conclusion 
cannot be disputed: the war's horror and suffering left a lasting imprint on the 
Austrians, but not only in terms ot their psyche. It lasted many years before the 
physical damage was repaired, but the citizens' resilience, practiced and honed 
in the stricken years of war, helped to build the country anew. 
The author Bischof speaks of an "Austrian spirit,"275 which, he says, was 
never "extirpated," but only grew and contributed to a surprising outcome. As a 
result of both the offensiveness of Nazi propaganda on one hand, and the trials 
of the American bombing on the other, which might have acted as a kind of 
catharsis, when everything was over, a new kind of nationalism emerged 
which, in the post-war era, helped Austrians form a new government and start 
anew as an independent nation. As early as April 27, 1945, only days after 
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Vienna's capture by the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian Front under Tolbukhin,276 and 
before the official date of surrender,277 something rather surprising and 
extraordinary happened: a provisional Austrian government under the 
presidency of Karl Renner was formed. If there ever was any doubt as to the 
condition of the population's morale, the fact that Austria was able to establish a 
new, Allied-sanctioned government so quickly, even before the official end of 
the war, showed that spirit was high. It is proof of the premise that the city of 
Vienna and its population had persevered. 
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